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Thi~ study outlines the design, implementation, and testing of the General Control 
Model as applied to the Future Theater-Level Model (FILM) for the control of loint and 
Allied Forces for all operational sides. The study develops a notion of battlefield control 
and describes the characteristics necessary to represent this notion of control in a 
computer simulation. Central to the implementation of the General Control Model i.~ the 
robust capability for the user-analyst to describe any control relationship of research 
interest and to do so without having 10 alter the programming code. The user-analyst is 
provided the capability to detenninc the cause and effcct relationship of different control 
representations in a simulation. A full description of the model is complimented by an 
explanation of the implementation to facilitate the use of the General Control Model. A 
discussion of the initial test results leads to a more rigorous test which confinns the 
intended behavior of the General Control Model in FILM. Lastly, recommendations for 
future improvements to the General Control Model and l<JLM: are outlined to assist future 
research endeavors. 
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EXECUTIVE SUI\tlMARY 
The impetus for thi~ study was the requirement of the United States Mlliwy 
Training Mission to demonstrate the causc and cffcct relationships as.~oc iated with 
di fferent joint control representations for the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. TIlls study 
develops a General Control Model using a described notion of control and implements this 
model in the Future 111eater Level Model (FILM). The General Control Model will serve 
as a robust analytic tool capable of presenting any control representation of interest. TItis 
analytic tool is intended to assist in the development of the Saudi Ambian Armed Forces 
control structure and in tum provide a control structure fOllildation for the Saudi Arabian 
computer simulations capability at the Saudi Arabian Command and General Staff College. 
'lbe Saudi Arabian Armed Forces control stll.lcture must be sensitive to unique Saudi 
Ambian political, cultural, and militaly control requirements while being capable of 
providing the most lethal use of military assets. 
The research goal was to develop and implement a control model in a perccption 
based computer simulation capable of representing joint and allied forces. Tbe product 
must be robust to en.~ure that the nser-analyst can de.~crihe any control representation and 
do so without t:hanbring the progr'dlllIlling code of FILM. Furthcnnore, the use of FILM 
naturally provides tbc capability to aodit eaeh simulation run and trace the origination of 
infonnation generated by sensors through the passing of that information between units 
according to tile described control representation. The audit process, the ability to 
compare unit perceptions, and the ability to compare unit perception to simulation ground 
truth provide an analytic tool capable of meeting the needs of researchers interested in 
lllldG[standing the effects of various control representations within a computer simulation. 
The General Control Model provides eight component~ to represent a control 
structure. These eight (:omponents are: 
1. the capability for units to maintain their own, individual perception of the battlefield 
environment and the corresponding enemy course of action, a.~ denoted hy ll;: 
2. the capability to describe unit ownership of sensor assets and specify the sensor 
characteristics commensurate with the hierarchical level of the unit; 
3. the capability to restrict a unit to acquire sensor observations from geographic 
locations within the unit's area of influence; 
4. the capability to describe sensor-to-unit and unit-to-unit relationships due to the 
enabling technologies infrastructure. called the control architecture and denoted by an 
arrow; 
5. the capability to describe sensor-to-unit and unit-to-unit relationships as prescribed by 
doctrine, called the control doctrine and denoted by an arrow; 
6. the capability to describe a stochastic time delay of sensor information associated with 
each directed sensor-to-unit and unit-to-unit link, denoted as ID(~j,ai); 
7. the capability to describe a stochastic probability of receiving a message to simulate 
the loss of sensor information associated with each directed sensor-to-unit and unit-to-
unit link.. denoted as PR(pij); and 
8. the capability to describe a staffing ability multiplier that is a characteristic of an 
individual unit and indicative of the unit's ability to perform the staff function of 
processing information, denoted as SAM(cx;). 
All eight components were implemented in FJ'LM and six control representations 
were developed to test the General Control Model. The testing of the General Control 
Model was divided into four set~ of tests. The first set of tcst~ consists of simulation runs 
where [\vo units mruntain individual perceptions for each of the six control representations. 
'lbe second set of tests consists of simulation runs where cleven units maintain individual 
perceptions for each of the six control representations. The third set of te:;t~ consists of 
four parameter sets. Each parameter set varies the characteristic values associated with 
the previously described components using the fIrst control representation as a basis for 
comparison. The fourth set of test~ consists of two excursionary simulation runs to show 
the increased computing resource required when increasing the number of units with 
wi 
individual perceptions ami to confirm the flexibility of representing different control 
structures using the General ConlrOJ Model. 
Test runs were analyred using the audit process, the ability to compare unit 
perceptions. and the ability to compare unit perception to simulation ground tmth. Each 
tested conlrOl representation behaved in a realistic manner as intended. Results verifIed 
that the General Control Model as implemented in FILM provides a robust means to 
represent conlrOl in a computer simulation. 
The study pointed to scverJ.i areas still needing additional research. First, a portion 
of the course of action update warrants verification. Second, a historical base of 
paramcter values which describe components of the GenemL Control Model would 
increase the believability of the model and the simulation accuracy of the units the model 
represents. Continuing research will provide further refInement to the capabilities offered 
by the Future Theater Level Model. 
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I. INTRODUCTION AND PROBLEM DEFINiTION 
A. OVERVIEW 
TIti.~ thesis develops a gcnef'JJ approat:h to representing military control in 
perception based war gamc simulations. Ib.e thesis then applies the general control modcl 
to thc Future Theater Level Model (FrLM) as a vehicle to determine cause and effect 
relationships between various control repre.<:entations. The relationships of interest include 
who wins, the similarity of perceptions of the battlefield amongst subordinate unit~ of an 
operational side, timeliness of auaining a similarity of perceptions if attained, and with 
what necessary commitment of forces through the selection of a common course of action 
against the enemy side. The control representations used for this analysis will include 
variations on the notions of centralization of information dissemination, decentralization of 
information dissemination, and ownership of sensor assets. The impetus for researching 
this growing area of interest is the United States Military Training Mission (USMTM) to 
the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia's need to provide an analytic tool to aid the Saudi Arabian 
Ministry of Defense and Aviation (SA.t\10DA) sut:h that SAMODA can improve their 
military control arcltitecture and doctrine. 
The general approach requires the development of mathematically modeled unique 
identities for individual units within a given computer war game simulation. The 
requirement for unique identities allows individual units to hold their own perception of 
the battlefield. "these perceptions may vary between sister andlor senior unit~ on the samc 
operational side of the conflict Unique perceptions by sub-units and the ability to 
describe control relationships as expressed in this thesis will eventually lead to flexible and 
dynamic branching 'Nithin a set of courses of action to be followed by sub-units at critical 
decision points using future developed artificial intelligence deci~ion set theory rather than 
a common, scripted course of action currently used in FTLM. Control representations 
will describe any military control architecture and doctrine of interest and will allow the 
analyst to specify who can talk to whom on th~ battlefield (control architecture), who 
chooses to talk to whom (control doctrine), and what individual headquarters do with 
infonnation. The control model envelopes the idea of ownership of sensor a~sct~ by 
describing reporting hierarchies and limiting sensor readings to the area of interest 
controlled by the owning unit, sensor-to-unit and unit-to-unit reporting hierarchies and the 
associated real world representations of infonnation time delays within units, the 
probability of successfully receiving information associated with communications 
hardware, and a staff's ability to process new sensor infonnation based upon the staffs 
level of training. 
n. HLSTORICAL BACKGROUND AND PERSPECTIVE 
Culturally, Saudi Arabia is a closed and cautious socicty. Western ideas and day-
to-day practices are opposite to Saudi beliefs and are considered eroding to the health of 
the Kingdom. Information is held as a precious commodity of power and not freely 
disseminated evcn when it would appear logical, from a Western viewpoint, to share the 
infonnation in order to better achieve common goals. 
With the advent of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia under the Saud Family and tlle 
historically recent wealth derived from Saudi Ambia's vast and rich oil basins, government 
imposed restrictions exist today which separate the military services. This separation 
precludes any fonnidable government opposition while it potentially lirnit.~ the defense 
capability of the armed forces. Over the years, the royal family has solidified power and 
the Kingdom has become more stable a~ a nation. Meanwhile, the Middle East region has 
become increasingly unstable. Saudi Arabia finds itself potentially requiring its full and 
optimal military ability to defend it~ territories. The possibility of a regional conflict, as 
dramatically evidenced by the Gulf War with Iraq, illustrates the potential need for Saudi 
Arabia to be fully capable to defend against aggressors. During the Gulf War, Saudi 
Arabia committed military forces to protect its northern border against Iraq. The Chief of 
Joint Section, USMTM, was a principal advisor to the Saudis during the war in the Nonh. 
He witnessed noticeable difficulties within the Saudi command and control structure, as 
well as the Saudi inability to operate as an eftective joint force. The inability to smoothly 
integrate the Saudi services initiated a process at Joint Section to investigate ways to 
better develop the Saudi Arabian Armed Forces (SAAF) command and control systems. 
Joint Section, USMTM, found that not only were communication links between services 
incompatible or nonexistent, but doctrine in use during training exercises and during 
conflict did not inelude any joint service capability. 
USMTM began a dialogue with the Commandant of the Saudi Arabian Command 
and General Staff College (SACGSC) to begin understanding command and control, as 
taught :md practiced within the Saudi Arahian Armed Forces. The primary goal of the 
designated Saudi committee was to develop thc SACUSC simulation capability. The 
committee's focus centered on an integrated joint simulations capability. Their immediate 
requirement is to develop a new control structure and doctrinc to better defend the 
Kingdom with the Saudi Arabian Armed Forces acting as a joint force. Their hope is to 
then use this new control structure and doctrine as a basis for their own war game 
simulation capability. It is important to the SAAF to develop a control structure Lhat is 
effective while being considerate of the unique Saudi culture. Adopting the United Slates 
control structure and doctrine is impractical since it is not sensitive to Saudi Amhia's 
unique cultural heritage. This realization by MODA marked an important first hurdle. 
Leadership within the SACGSC recognized a control deficiency during the Gulf War and 
decided to correct Lhe shortfall. 1bcy did not blindly copy what Lhe U.S, was doing, but 
decided to create a blended control system representative of their culture, political 
requiremcnLS, and mostly U.S. weapon systems. They decided to use simulations and 
operations research as a vehicle to assist in convincing decision makers to make 
appropriate change. 
C. UI\'ITED STATES MUJITA RY TRAINING MISSION 
The purpose of thc United States Military Liaison Mission to the Kingdom of 
Saudi Arabia is two fold. First, the USMTM advises Saudi Arabia in the training and 
doctrinal use of equipment and forces. Secondly, they provide the formal link for foreigu 
military sales of equipment betweeu thc United States and the Saudi govemments. 
USMTM comprises senior officers and non-commissioned officers from each branch of 
service and works as a joint command under the leadership of a two star geneml. 
USMTM curreutly operates in thc capital city of Riyadh with the Ministry of Defense and 
Aviation (MODA): the Joints Chief of Staff equivalent. and with each of the service 
dcparunenL~ to include Army, Navy, Air Force, and Air Defense. Joint Section, USMTM, 
is tasked to advise the Saudi Arabian equivalent of the Joint Chlefs of Staff, MODA. 
Although MODA, in theory, is the senior agency to each of the services, each .<:ervice has 
an autonomy associated with it and often operates independently. 
D. U. S. INVOLVE:MENT 
Change does not occur quickly in Saudi Arabia. Consensus is required for each 
decision and is often difficult to obtain. The Ministry of Defense and Aviation (MODA) 
must be convinced that a better alternative exi~ts in the area of control to warrant change. 
The United States Military Training Mission began assisting MODA and SACGSC with 
the development of the SAAF war game simulation capability and concurred that 
simulations would be an appropriate vehicle to aid MODA's decision making process in 
the development of a control structure capable of joint operations. 
The cultural differences between the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the United 
States dictate the currently adopted and practiced control structures. USMTM strongly 
believes that it does not provide the most lethal force given the mostly U.S. designed and 
made military assets of Saudi Arabia. U.S. interests reside with a strong Kingdom of 
Saudi Arabia in the Middle East. USMTM i~ committed to advise Saudi Arabia such that 
Saudi Arabia has the most effective force possible in that critical region. Fortunately, and 
concurrent to U.S. interests, senior Saudi leaders at the Saudi ArJ.bian Ministry of Defense 
and Aviation (MODA) are working to make progressive change t.broughout the Saudi 
Arabian Armed Forces (SAAF). These senior leaders envi~ion the use of analytic tools 
and quantitative studies a.~ a strong and persuasive tool to provide current decision 
makers. They hope to begin a more pragmatic and analytic approach to decision making, 
rather than a cultural one. The frrst steps have been taken to develop an operations 
research department within MODA. 
Operations research as a decision aid tool for the SAAF has only been introduced 
on the most basic level. Although the Petroleum University in Dhahran and the King Faud 
University in Riyadh teach operations research, their focus has exclusively been towards 
business applications. Only in recent years has a bridge been built by Colonel Al-Otaibi of 
the Royal Saudi Army to intnxlucc operations rer;carch as an important decision aid tool 
for the military through thc pubucation of the first military operations research text. (Al-
Otaibi,1993) 
E. SPONSOR'S PROBLEM 
The current military control structure and control doctrine of Saudi Arabia do not 
provide the most advantageous and lethal use of asscts. USMTM: requires all easiJy 
understood and flexible analytic tool, using operations research techniques, to a.~sist in 
MODA's decision for a more lethal control structure for the Saudi Arabian Anned Forces 
(SAAf). A computer simulation model which can ~-pecifically show the effects of various 
control structures and control doctrines is required. The model must be general in scope 
and capable of being custom tailored by the user/analyst for national security reasons. 
The end product of this research will be a computer simulation integrating the 
general control model and capable of showing the effects of control within an analyst 
specified military organization. Proof of principle of the control model within Fl"LM will 
consist of a comparison of six different control representations and will primarily show 
how individual unit~ perceive the enemy's ground truth course of action. Not only will the 
accurate perception of the correct enemy course of action be an issue, but also the 
limeliness to achieve the correct perception of the enemy' s selection of its course of 
action. USMrM, or any miliLary organiUltion, will be able to take a glven scenario in 
FILM and produce results for each conU'OI representation of interest and determine which 
control representation is best to achieve success on the battlefield. 
The analyst will be able to specify the details of any control representation of 
interest. These details will include specifying the hierarchy of information flow betwecn 
individually specified units; specify ownership of sensor assets by individually specified 
units; specify sensor and communication link mean time delays of information and the 
associated standard deviation; and specify the probability of successfully receiving the 
information being communicated. Furthermore, the analyst will be able to specify the 
staffs ability to clarify or confound information based upon its level of training and 
experience. A mapping function using human factors to develop a staffing ability 
multiplier is proposed for future research. 
The simulation integrated control model is intended to be a persuasive decision aid 
for commanders and staffs on how best to control diverse and numerous forces and sensor 
assets engaged in peacetime and wartime opemtions. 
n, LITERATURE REVIEW AND RELEVANT FACTORS 
A. IMPORTANCE OF STUDYING MILiTARY CONTROL 
Extensive work has been done in the area of Command, Control, and 
Communications (C3) as a grouped set of operational concepts. Typically, C3 is regarded 
as a single entity with the scientifIc focus on the tangible qualitie.~ of communieatioIl~ and 
the supporting enabling technologies. Most military schools regard the flIst C, Command, 
as an operational art and not a science. Command cannot be broken down into an 
rugori thmic discipline, but is rather a complex series of judgments, with moral and ethical 
bases, logical rationale, and personal experience all playing their respective and wei ghted 
parts in the decision making process. The second C, Control, has often been ignored or 
wrapped up with the either the fIrst C or the third C, Communications. 
Control is a structure or architecture which the commander envisions as the critical 
paths for the sharing and processing of information hefore, during, and after the decision 
making process to achieve his intent. Control encompa~scs not only the plan to pass 
information to sp;x:ified uni ts on the battlefield, but also what those units do with tile 
information and how well and quickly they do it. Control further encompa~ses the truth in 
information and the planned de<,-eption of the enemy through the passing of 
misinformation. 
Communications acts as the enabling technology, or the highway over which this 
information i~ passed. Communications is often dealt with as a directed path between two 
or more units. Volumes of work have heen done on optimizing the enabling technology 
infra~tructure. The intricacies of communications is not the purpose of this general 
control model representation. Although communications is far more tangible than control, 
understanding necessary control relationships is the fundamenlal. flIst step before the 
creation of the communications infra~trucmre. 
Joint Pub 1-02 (AFSC, 1993) defmcs Command and Control as: 
The exercise of authority and direction by a properly designated 
commander over assigned forces in the accomplishment of the mission. 
Command and control functions are performed through an arrangement of 
personneL, equipment, communications, facilitie..~, and procedures employed 
by a commander in planning, directing, coordinating, and controlling forces 
and operations in the accomplishment of the mission 
It further defines Command and Control Systems as: 
The facilities, equipment, communications, procedures, and 
personnel essential to a commander for planning, directing, and controlling 
operations of assigned forces pursuant to the missions assigned. 
and Command, Control, Communications, and Computer Systems (C4 Systems) as: 
Integrated systems of doctrine, procedures, organizational 
structures, personnel, equipment, facilities, and communications designed 
to support a commander's exen:ise of command and control through all 
phases of the operational continuum. 
All three definitions include the term control and arc closely related. There are 
numerous defmitions for command and control and an equal number of paradigms 
representing the C3 process (Johnson, 1988). This paper will use the Joint Pub definition 
as the basic reference for defining command and control in an opemtional context 
Keep in mind that the research aim is to def"me, within a computer simulation, the 
"arrangement of personnel, equipment, communications, facilities, and procedures 
employed" by permitting the analyst to specify the "doctrine, procedures, and 
organizational structures." The equipment naturally must be considered for the 
communications to flow. 
The March 1993 edition of PHALANX. The Bulletin of Military Operations 
Research, conuuns an article by LTG Wilson A. Shoffner entitled Future Battlefield 
Dynamics and Complexities Require Timely and Rclevant Information. (Shoffner, 1993) 
General Shoffner addresses the importance of C2 and pulls the acronym apart to fonn two 
separate terms; command and control. He states that "each word is different and carries 
with it significantly different meanings, ideas and responsibilities." He further states that 
"Our future leaders must understand this diffcrencc, especially as it applies to tactical 
decision making." General Shoffner defines control as: 
a sciencc of reguJating forces and functions on thc hattlefidd to 
execute the commander's intent. Control is a more precise means through 
which staffs support their commander's intent and work with othcr staffs. 
Control perfOllllS thc functions shown in this figure and is primarily the 
staffs business. Commanders anticipate changc and staft:~ project change. 
Figure 1 is a reproduction of General Shoffner's control diagram from the March 1993 
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Figure 1. "LTG Shoffner's Control Diagram From Ref. (Shoffner, 1993)." 
The top block of Figure I , labeled "Defining Limits," implies the area of interest 
and the control doctrine which provides general guidance. It provides the answer to who 
chooses to talk to whom. This also suggesL~ the procedures of sending infollllation that 
may exist due to a hkrarchy or to an alert channeL The block labeled "Allocating Means" 
implies ownership. Not only docs thi~ address chain of command relationships between 
units, it also includes which sensors belong to whom. TIle hlock labeled "Describing 
Interfaces" implies the control architecture. It provides the answer to who can to talk to 
whom. Associated with the communications hardware are the realities of time delays and 
the loss of infonnation. The remainder of the blocks represent the human-performed staff 
process within the headquarters. 
The December 1993 edition of PHALANX, The Bulletin of Military Operations 
Research, contains an article by Col. Thomas A Cardwell ill, Ph.D .. The article entitled 
Theater Air C3 Analyses - Future Needs further discusse,~ LTG Shoffner's article in tenns 
of the needs of the Air Force. (Cardwell, 1993) Col. Cardwell asserts that the military 
community should be "able to di.ssect control, study it, and put it back together again so 
that it provides the commander with maximum force effectiveness," Col. Cardwcll 
believes that levels of control elements exist and that there i~ a ''unifying theme that ties 
them together and allows us to sy~tematieally examine control so that we may optimize its 
developmenL" 
B, RESEARCH IN MILITARY CONTROL AND RELATED SYSTEMS 
Work done in the field of command and control has focused either on representing 
the decision making process associated with information systems or on the specific 
performance specifications of the information system itself. (Alexander, 1974) The 
Lawson Model is a common representation of the C2 decision making process. The 
diagram in Figure 2 best describes the model. 
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The Lawson Mooel (c. 1980) 
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mlllGlIEl< 
AUlllOIUTY 
Fi~oure 2. "The Lawson Model From Ref. (Johmon,1988)" 
TIle top block labeled "SENSE·· parallels the use of sensors to achieve a snapshot 
picture of some portion of the environmenL TIlls information is sent to a headquarters 
where it is processed and combined with previous external data A comparison of the 
perceived current condition of the environment and the desired state is made. A decision 
is made on what to do to either correct the perceived current condltion of the envjronment 
or sustain it, if desired. Decision aids arc used in the decision making process. Orders are 
issued and a subordinate unit (one's own force) acts upon the cnvironment to affect 
necessary change. TIle process repeats itself until some end state is reached. The cnd 
state could be that the environment matches our de.sire.s, our ability to act upon the 
environment is depleted, or that our desires have changed to match the current 
environment (John~on, 1988). 
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C. REPRESENTING MD..ITARY CONTROL IN SIMULATIONS 
Representing military control in simulations and war games typically suggests the 
paths along which infonnation is sent between entities on the battlefield. No explicit 
documentation exists which reflects the ability for an analyst to represent various control 
architectures and control doctrines in a simulation (Youngren, 1994). Consequently, this 
thesis researches an important capability; to represent military control in computer 
simulatiOIL~ and be able to conduct cause and effect analysis to detenninc control 
differences between analyst specified control structures. 
DefIning military control mathematically is not readily apparent. The following 
definition provides a list of characteristics whlch a control model will need to describe 
mathematically. An integral step is to determine whlch current functiOIL~ within a war 
game simulation can be adapted or augmented to model control and whlch functions must 
be added. The characteristics of control whlch the methodology of design will address arc 
posed as the critical questions which the model must address: 
1. How well do suboniinate units share the commander's intent based upon the control 
archltecture and eontrol doctrine? (Inter-service and joint opcmtions) 
2. When suboniinate units share similar pcrccptioIL~ ofthc commander's intent (similar or 
sopporting Course of Action), how well does the force achieve the mission given the 
control archltecture and control doctrine? 
3. When subordinate units do not share similar perceptions of the commander's intent 
(dissimilar Courses of Action), how well docs the force achleve the mission given the 
control architecture and control doctrine? 
4. How does the commander's intent (most likely Course of Action) compare to ground 
truth? (Would it have had any effect on 2 or3 above in any case?) 
5. How do variations in the control architecture, control doctrine, and the associated 
parameterized characteristics, affect the sharing of similar or supporting perceptions 
and subsequent battle outcomes? (Which units talk to whlch other onits and which 
sensors belong to which units?) 
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D. FUTURE THEATER LEVEL MODEL (FTLM) 
'lbe Future Theater Level Model (Fl'LM) was chosen as the platform simulation 
for two reasons. First, FTLM is a perception based simulation. Th.i~ quality pennits the 
concepts of individual identities and decisiolL~ ha.~ed upon the perceptions of those 
individual identities. Secondly, FILM is an easy to use, personal computer based 
simulation that ha.~ been developed for rapid analysis. It provides a complete audit trail of 
all functions within the simulation. Adapting a control mooel to FrLM is a natural 
progression in the development of FfLM as an analysis tool. 
Once the general control model has been integrated into FTIM. comparative 
analysis between the various control representations of interest will determine if the 
control moocl adequately represents reality. The basic design of FrLM pennil~ the 
analyst to compare unit-to-unit commonality of selected courses of action. As a unit's 
perception of the hattlefteld is updated, the urnt's selection for a course of action is 
updated. Subsequently, the selected course of action can be compared to the enemy 
ground truth and since courses of aetion fo r each side must correspond one-to-one, a 
determination can be made whether the correct course of action has been selected. Thc 
analyst specifies which scripted course of action the enemy i~ taking. The friendly side's 
perception of the appropriate course of action over time and the critical point where the 
friendly side commits to a course of action can be traced and is dependent upon obtaining 
sensor information of the environment. The fricndly selection of a course of action can 
then be compared to the selected. scripted enemy course of action to determine if the 
friendly side perceived the environment correctly when compared to enemy ground truth. 
The analyst is able to compare all friendly unit perceptions for any commonality of a 
seJected course of action. Deviations between units can be recognized and the associated 
chaos of control due to dissimilar perceptions can be determined. 
FrLM provides an audit trail at each time interval to include the unit's current 
perception and course of action, to include the associated probabilities. Secondly, each 
unit's perception and chosen course uf action can be compared to ground truth within the 
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model as well as to other units on the same operational side. A measure of perfonnanee 
to reflect deviations from ground truth will be applied. A visual plot of each unit's 
associated probability that the unit pl.'fccive~ the ~elected ground truth enemy course of 
action, plotted on the y axi". over time on the x axis, will provide a quick check of 
whether a unit's perception of the environment is correct. As a unit's probability of 
perceiving the enemy ground truth course of action approaches one, that unit is morc 
accurately perceiving its environmenL Plotting several units on the same chart will 
visually indicate the level of similarity in perceiving the environment. Unit plots should be 
roughly similar when perceptions arc shared and similar. Again, deviation from ground 
truth can be audited to the time step when the deviation occumxi by examining the sensor 
observations history flles. 
Although all possible combinations between units and ground truth could be 
considered for compari.'>on. it is more practical to limit initial comparison.'> betwecn units 
for the recognition of similar or dissimilar perceptions and common courses of action. 
Only after it L~ determined that an operational side shares a common perception is the 
question of comparison to ground truth relevant. Comparison to ground truth at this point 
is important since it will allow the analyst to know the difference between an operational 
side which shares similar perceptions while it follows the correct course of action and an 
operational side which ~hares similar perceptions while it follows an incorrect course of 
action. 
Currently in FILM. sensor reports consist of a "bean count" of assets on a node 
by asset type. 1bis information L~ provided to a Bayesian update ,--ycie along with the 
ground truth mean for that asset type, the variance associated with the sensor, and the 
prior from all previous sensor ob~ervations for that asset type. The update map~ into a 
probability associated with the possible courses of action which the enemy may choose. 
As an artifact from the original versions of FILM, a detection model exists which 
acts as the trigger to schedule a sensor. This step is vital to the integration of the ~cnsor 
model within FILM. One would not send out a scarce asset such as a sensor unless one 
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had some provocation. However, the detection also contributes to the course of action 
perception update. Essentially, the course of action perception update is affected twice by 
the same acqui~ition, but in two distinct ways. Two components are responsible for the 
course of action perception update, a detection component and a sensing component. 
Semantically, these two component.~ appear to mean the samc thing; however they 
do not. A detection is merely the acquisition of some potentially significant item at a 
known location. A. sensing provides quantification of the item at a known location; say 
two tanks and three howitzers. The level of infonnation increases from a detection to a 
sensing. To be able to reduce the analysis to the effects of a control model of quantified 
infonnati.on, the detection component of the course of action perception update must be 
eliminated This is reasonable sinee the sensing already inherently includes the fact tbat a 
detection occurred. A sensing would never take place unless a detection had triggered it 
It appears thai the detection componenl is redundant witb the advent of the sensor model 
within FUM. An opinion would not have been formed unless the gatherer had some 
quantifiable level of information, which is exactly what the sensor is providing. Future 
research may involve treating the deteclion as a separate and weighted piece of 
information to be shared between units within FIL\1. lltis will result in a study of the 
magnitudes of wcighl~ associated with thc various levels of information when they are 
combined into a single function 
Another design feature of FILM is that the possible courses of action for both 
friendly and enemy side;; are prcscribed in detail and must correspond one-to-one. 1his 
ensures that if the enemy is pursuing a course of aclion, the eorrttt friendly course of 
action is the one-to-one corresponding friendly course of action prescribed to defeat the 
enemy course of action. Each operational side now perceives, in the form of a probability, 
which course of action it hclievcs the opposing operational side is pmsuing. 'Ibis process 
occurs for an operational side as a single entity, regardless of the quantity and type of units 
composing the operational side. When a sensor has information to report, the simulation 
update process provides an in~tantaneous and shared perception of the battlefteld to all 
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units of the operational side in question on a perioclic basis. This perception is maintained 
as a single Bayesian update cycle. The simulation acts as if each unit gets the same 
infonnation and that they do so without interruption or delay. This does not represent the 
true flow of information on the battlefield 
FTLM docs not currently account for the effecl~ of control explicitly. The general 
contrnl model developed in this thesis will provide a more realistic representation of units 
and sensors and how they interact through the passing of infonnation. hnplementation of 
the control model will be applicable to both operational sides and introduce realism into 
the control of forces. Furthcnnore. the control representation will be flexible and allow 
different variation.s of control to pennit cause-and-effect analysis. The control 
representation model will provide a foundation for future artificial intelligence endeavors 
in FfLM and hopefully allow a meaningful use of individual decision sets for sub-units. 
This will enable sub-unil~ to make critical decisions according to the described decision set 
theory. The eventual introduction of artificial intelligence into FTLM will eliminate the 
requirement for courses of action in FILM to be described and fixed. Courscs of action 
will become dynamic, less rigid, and contain multiple branches at any given critical 
decision point at the sub-unit level 
For a complete description of FILM, refer to the thesis hy Karl M. Schmidt, 
entitled Design Methodology for FTLM (Schmidt. 1993). 
E. RESEARCH OBJECTIVES 
The primary ohjective is to design and integrate a control model into a theater level 
simulation. This will allow an analyst to study the effects of different control 
representations within the context of an operational situation. Thc model will provide an 
analytic method to study different control structure alternatives. The analyst will better 
understand the sensor-tn-unit and unit-to-unit relationships of control on the battlefield. 
Additionally, control's relationship with battle outcomes will become marc apparent This 
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can be extended to any military organization that can specify their current control 
architecture and control doctrine. 
Doctrine is addressed since it reflect~ the general path to a goal. For an example, 
U.S. doctrine states that the Army and the Air Force will fight joint The procedures to do 
so are important. but they would not exist without the vision which the doctrine sets forth 
on the conduct of joint operations. Control doctrine in the context of thi~ the~is includes 
being capable of describing important information exchange relationships between services 
and allies, sensors and unit~, as well as describing procedures to achieve the doctrinal 
intent The Doctrine Control Matrix specified in Chapter ill deseribes mathematically the 
doctrinal relationship of units. It may, on the surface, appear redundant with the 
Architecture Control Matrix discussed in Chapter III, however its purpose is to dellneate 
between whether an operational side cannot form a specific information exchange link or 
whether it chooses not to form that link. The difference is subtle, but will allow the 
analyst to show the using military organization whcther a change is needed in terms of 
hardware procurement or doctrinal text. The doctrine specifics whether or not the Anny 
will work with the Air Force. The same matrix may specify the procedures; that is, it may 
state that the Army must fIrst talk to the Joint Command as a conduit for talking to the Air 
Force. 
The using military organization can run the simulation with their identified control 
structure alternatives and conduct comparative analyses against various other control 
architectures and control doctrine. 
F . INITIAL CO~TROL MODEL 
The diagram in Figure 3 depicts an initial model of the interactions that occur at a 
unit headquarters with regards to the receipt, processing, and passing of information. 
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Figure 3. Nodal Control Model 
The Architecture Matrix Filter addresses the communication hardware realities that 
exist between nodes. Infonnation can only be pennitted to flow if a link exists. If a link 
does exist, the passing of information is possibly delayed andlor perturbed. The Doctrine 
Matrix FIlter addresses doctrinally and procedunilly which nodes pass information. 
Although the Architecture Matrix Filter may have a possible link between two nodes, the 
doctrine may prohibit the link or may not addn=ss two nodes communicating together. 
lhls allows the analyst to identify if an improvement can be made non-materially, or if new 
hardware is required to improve control. The control node is where the infonnation is 
processed, otherwise referred to as a "uniC' in this thesis. The information is added to the 
current external data and the picture of the battlefield is relmed as described by the 
Lawson Model. The control node addresses the capability of the staff to separate the 
wheat from the chaff by either being able to rerme the new sensor information or by being 
mislead significantly and increasing the variance of the current estimate. 
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G. ASSUMPTIONS 
1be underlying premise for this research is the notion of organizational control. 
Organizational control is the degree of consensus within the organization to meet the 
stated objectives. An organization which holds similar perceptions and behaviors (courses 
of actions) acts in com:ert and is said to have a high dcgree of control. An organization 
which hold~ ilissimilar perceptions and behaviors (courses of actions) acts in chaos and is 
said to have a low degree of controL An important assumption is that an organization 
acting in concert with a higher degree of control prubabilistically provides better 
pelformance outcomes, while an organization aeting in chaos probabilistic ally provides 
poorer pelfonnance outcomes. 
Ibis control model concept L~ based upon a di~tributed network allowing 
perceptions and courses of aetions (COAs) at each node to be similar or dissimilar to the 
encompassing family of nodes to which it belongs. A node is defined as any operational 
unit where infonnation and directives are processed to result in suhsequent action (COA 
selection). Subsequent actions may also include directives and passing information to 
subordinate, adjacent and superior headquarters. Similar or dissimilar perceptions at a 
node are possihle when the encompassing set, say friendly units, possess a unique and 
exclusive set of sensor sources that are owned by specified units. However, the sensor 
infonnation, when and if passed to and interpreted at each unique friendly subordinate 
headquarters, may rcsult in dissimilar perceptions of the banlefield Tht: same will be uuc 
for the opposing force. Funhermore, the network act~ as a security network where 
aecess, bolh. ingress and egress, may be open, interrupted, or closed betweeo specified 
nodes for rea~()IL~ of doctrine and/or capabilities (enabling technologies). 
The Bernoulli distribution with a single mean probability parameter, p, is used to 
provide the analyst lhc ability to represent a successful or an unsuccessful receipt of a 
scnsor-to-unit communication or a unit-to-unit communication. 
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The Lognormal distribution with a mean and a standard deviation parameter, j.l and 
a, is used to provide the analyst the ability to represent the positive time delay of a sensor-
to-unit communication or a unit-to-unit communication. 
The Staffing Ability Multiplier, a, provides the analyst a means to influence the 
variance associated with a sensor report as if the staff were able to confound or clarify the 
incoming report during the intelligence process. 
H, LIMIl'A TIONS 
Increasing the nwnbcr of unil~ with individual Bayesian update cycles which permit 
unique sub-unit pcn::eptions increases the computing hurden on the computer system 
hardware and subsequently increases the time for each replication. A replication with just 
one unit maintaining a perception may take 10 minutes, whereas a replication with thirty 
unil~ maintaining individual perceptions may take longer than 48 hours depending upon 
the control architecture. Control architecmres which allow all sensor report.~ to eventually 
reach all units are more computationally time intensive than control architectures limiting 
sensor reports to certain units. 
Logistic units in the scenario no longer contribute to the pen::eption update cycle 
after the time until attack and time until reinforcement are determined. TIris allows the 
simulation to process the combat unit sensor data in a more reasonable time with the 
associated decrease in memory allocation for the logistic units. Although this provides a 
lack of realism, since logistic writs arc not contributing to an opposing side's perception 
for the entire replication, the savings in time to run the replication justify the limitation 
when logistic units are not the immediate subject ofinteresL 
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SCOPE 
Six alternative control representations will be run to verify the control model. 
These alternativcs will represent ccntralized infonnation dissemination and decentralized 
infonnation dissemination and sensor ownership. The base case, which renect~ the current 
FILM and a single perception for each operatlonal side, will be the point of reference. An 
important note is that Case 5 produces the same thcater pereeption that the base ca~e 





(No Suil-unil Perception.) 
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Figure 4. Base Case Control Representation 
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1. Case 1 
Case 1 consists of each divisional unit possessing a sensor defined to he capable of 
making observations restricted to the divisions corridor. The division in turn pa."-SCS all 
sensor reports to the theater. The theater then sends the report from a division to each of 
the other divisions described on that operational side. The theater also possesses a sensor 
defined to be capable of making ohservations anywhere in the theater and sends each 
repon to each of the divisions. The flow of infonnation is two way, lower-to-higher and 
higher-to-lower. 1bis alternative represents the greatest possibility of sharing infonnation 




Figure 5. Case 1 Control Representation 
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2. Case 2 
Case 2 consists of each divisional unit possessing a sensor defmed to be capable of 
making observations resuicted to the division's conidor. The division does not pass any 
sensor report to the theater. l11.e theater also possesses a sensor defined to be capable of 
making observations anywhere in the theater and sends each repon to each of the 
divisions. The t10w of information is one way, higher-to-lower. This alternative 
represents a centrali7.ed structure of control while maintaining the lUX-ury of affording 
sensors to each divisional unit and above. Figure 6 depicts Case 2. 
Information Flow 
ease 2 
Figure (,. Case 2 Control Representation 
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3. Case 3 
Case 3 consists of cach divisional unit possessing a sensor defmed to be capable of 
making observations restricted to the division's corridor. The division in turn passes all 
sensor reports to the theater. The theater is capable of accepting information from 
subordinate units, but does not send information back to the subordinate units. The theater 
also possesses a sensor defined to 00 capable of making observations anywhere in the 
theater but, again, does not share sensor reports with the divisions. The flow of 
information is one way. lower-to-higher. This alternative represents a centralized 
structure of control while maintaining the luxury of affording sensors to each divisional 
unit and above. Figure 7 depicts Case 3. 
Infonnation Flow 
Case 3 
Figure 7. Case 3 Control Representation 
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4. Case 4 
Case 4 consists of each divisional tmit possessing a sensor defmcd to be capable of 
making observations restricted to the division's specified corridor. The division in turn 
passes all sensor reports to the theater. The theater is capable of accepting infonnation 
from subordinate units. but does not send information baek to the subonlinate units. The 
theater does not possess a sensor. The flow of infonnation is one way, lower-to-rugher. 
TIlls alternative represents a centralized slructure of control while maintaining the luxury 
of affording sensors to each divisional unit but not to thc theater. Figure 8 depicts Case 4. 
Information Flow 
Case 4 
Figure 8. Case 4 Control Representation 
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5. Case 5 
Case 5 consists of the theater possessing a sensor defined to be capable of making 
observations anywhere within the theater. The theater is capable of passing information to 
each subordinate unit. The divisional units do not possess sen~ors. The flow of 
information is one way, higher-ta-lower. TIris alternative represents a centralized 
structure of control with only one sensor. Figure 9 depicts Case 5. 
Information Flow 
CaseS 
Figure 9. Case 5 Control Representation 
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6. Case 6 
Case 6 consists of each dilliional unit possessing a sensor dermed to be capable of 
making observations anywhere along the divil;ion's corridor. The division does not pass 
sensor reports to the theater. The theater is not capable of accepting infonnation from 
subordinate units. The theater also possesses a sensor dermed to be capable of making 
observations anywhere in the theater but, again, does not share each repon to each of the 
divisions. The flow of infonnation docs not exist beyond the reports provided by sensors 
owned by the receiving urnt. This alternative represents an unconnected structure of 
control while maintaining the luxury of affording sensors to each divisional unit and above. 
Figure 10 depicts Case 6 
Information Flow 
Case 6 
'Theater _ -Snsor 
Unitt I 
j = (Se'''Divi<io~>l Utlit.>} 
Figure 10. Case 6 Control Representation 
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.1. TEST DESIGN 
The testing of the general control model as implemented in FILM will require an 
operational context in which to conduct the teSL The operational context will be the 
Korean Peninsula The test run will be conducted in three parts. The first part will be to 
run replications using the six previously defmed control representations, Case I through 
Case 6, while holding the parameters fIxed. The second part will be to run the Case 1 
control representation and varying the previously defined parameter sets. 
1. Test Scenario 
'The Korean peninsula scenario, currently in use by the FILM research team and 
developed by CPT Greg Brouillette (Brouillette, 1994) and LT Mike Fulkerson 
(Fulkerson, 1994), i .. the operational context for the integrated control model analysis. 
The scenario consist~ of two opposing sides; the North is called Red and the South is 
called Blue. Both sides are composed of Anny, Navy, Air Force, and Marine units. The 
general scenario consists of a logistics build-up in North Korea and the early entry 
required by U,S. forces to augment South Korean forces and already emplaced U.S. 
forces. An estimated attack time is calculated for the North Korean forces amI the 
Southcrn forces prepare to defend according to that estimate. Once the attack is launched 
by the North, the battle commences until either North or South win. 
There arc three courses of action defined in the scenario data file. The threc 
courses of action, from which the simulation must assign probabilities, possess similarities 
which will provide a more rigorous test than having three courses of action which possess 
no similarities; and which are thereby easier to detennine as ground truth by simple 
elimlnation. 
For example, if three courses of action follow three distinct and unique corridors 
which share absolutely no nodes or transit nodes, any sensor report on any node or transit 
node will immediately point to a unique and corresponding course of action. The 
remaining two courses of action will be eliminated and the prior to the Bayesian update 
cycle will be represented by 1.0 for the ground truth course of action. To ensure that the 
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prior can never reach 1.0, and thereby permit the Baytsian update cycle to be capable of 
being changed from the currently held pereeption when new sensor repofl~ are generated, 
a number close to l.0, but not 1.0, will always replacc a prior of 1.0, if attained. For 
practical purposes of affording the Bayesian update cycle to change when conditions are 
such that the prior becomes absolutely certain of a course of action, tills change is 
necessary and reasonable. Thc Bayesian update cycle will be discussed further in Chapter 
ffi. 
The test runs will all use course of action one as thc opposing force, or Enemy, 
ground truth course of action. For a complete description of the courses of action and the 
operational scenario, refer to thc thesis by CPT Brouillette (Brouillette, 1994) and the 
thesis by LT Fulkerson (Fulkerson, 1994). The scenario and the ground truth course of 
action will remain the same for all replications. 
2. Control Representation Test Runs 
For the frrst part, two set.'l of replications will be made for each of the control 
representation case alternatives. The fIrst set of replications will consist of a simple test 
run using just two urnt.'l with individual perceptions, the theater and a divisional combat 
unit This will provide a fundamental check that the assertions of the general control 
model are behaving in a manner commensurate with the intent of the design. 
The second set of replications will consist of a rigorous test run using eleven unit, 
with individual perceptions; the theater, six combat unit.'l, tllrcc naval units, and an airbase. 
This will provide a second check that the assertions of the general control model are 
behaving in a manner commensurate with the intent of the design. Each run will be 
analyzed for gencral trends. 
Parameters for the mean and variance of the time delay, the probability of a 
successful receipt of a trdnsmission, and the stafImg ability multiplier will al l be fued to a 
set of values to ensure that these pantmeters do not confound the comparison of control 
representations. Tahle I shows the base set of parameter values which will be used for the 
rust part of the analysis, with time parameters given in minutes. 
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SenSQrto ScllSOrto Theater 10 DiviSion 10 
~ DivisiQll Division }bea .... 










SlaffingAbility 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 
Mnltiolier C1 
Table 1. Parameter Set 1 
3. Parameter Set Test Runs 
For the second pan. the parameters will be varied 10 dctennine the effecl they 
cause during the course of a replication and their propensity 10 reflect realism of the 
characteristics they intend to model. General trends will be drawn from the replications 
and the sets of parameters. The general trends will be discussed as to whether thcy follow 
a common sense representation of reality and if the model is capable of providing a usable 
model for the described research objectives. 
The following descriptions of the parameter sets will be used for the second part of 
the analysis. Table 1 consists of the parameter values used in the f1rSt pan of the analysis. 
This sel will serve as lhe inltial base case for comparisons between lhe subsequent 
parameter sets. Table 2 shows Parameter set 2. Parameter Set 2 decreases the Bernoulli 
parameter (p). All other parameters remain the same as in Parameter Sci 1. 
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Table 2. Parameter Set 2 
Table 3 sbows Parameter set 3. ParllIIleter Set 3 increases the Lognonnal delay time mean 
(Jl) and variance (ci) parameters. 
Table 3. Parameter Set 3 
Tabk 4 shows Parameter set 4. Parameter Set 4 increases the Staffing Ability 
Multiplier. All other parameters remain the same as in Parameter Sct 1. 
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Table 4. Parameter Set 4 
Table 5 shows Parameter set 5. Parameter Set 5 decreases the Staffing Ability 
Multiplier. All other parameters remain the same as in Parameter Set 1. 
Table S. Parameter Set 5 
4. Excursion Test RlUL<; 
The thin! part will be an excursion to determine the limitations associated with 
increasing the number ofumts with individual perceptions and the amount of time required 
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to run the replication. and a composite case with the control representation shown in 







Figure 11. Composite Case Control Representation 
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m. GENERAL CONTROL MODEL METHODOLOGY AND !<'UTURE 
THEATER LEVEL MODEL IJ\iIPLEMEl\TATION 
A. DEFINITION OF UNJT PERCEPTION 
Central to the development of the general control model is the ability for a unit to 
maintain a perception (IT) of its environment within a computer simulation. Webster 's 
New Collegiate Dictionary dermes perception as "a mental image or awan.."11ess of the 
elements of environment through physical sensation." For the general control model, a 
unit perception embodies the commanders opinion of the enemy units he is facing and the 
enemy course of action being pursued, thus providing the commander a basis of 
knowledge from which to decide upon an appropriate counter-measure. Note the use of 
the word opinion. Webster's defines opinion as " a belief stronger than impression and 
less strong than positive knowledge." Dcci~ions are rarely made with perfect knowledge. 
A unit's perception represents an accumulation of the available sensor knowledge and 
does not necessarily reflcx:t omniscience or ground truth. A perception represents a body 
of knowledge consisting of what is believed to be the best available infonnatioIL 
The defmition of a unit perception for the general control mooel is what the 
commander believes to be the current number, type, and composition of enemy units, 
referred to as the order of banle, and the current course of action the enemy is most likely 
to pursue. 'llie unit perception of both order of battle and enemy course of action is based 
on sensor information in the fonn of counts of enemy soldiers, vehicles, and weapon 
systems and the location of these quantifiable attributes. The perception of both enemy 
order of battle and enemy course of action is the unit's belief of the relative likelihood of 
the possible unit numbers, types, and combinations and the possible course of action 
alternatives. A unit perception is furtherdd1ned to be a probability vector of the possible 
nwnbcr, types, and combinatioIL~ of enemy unit~ and the possible enemy eourses of action. 
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This defmition of unit perception provides the framework for the general control 
model. 
.8. GENERAL CONTROL MODEL 
The general control model is composed of eight major components. The 
components arc: 
1. the capability for units to maintain their own, individual perception of the battlefield 
environment and the corresponding enemy course of action, as denoted by OJ; 
2. the capability to describe unit ownersltip of sensor assets and specify the sensor 
characteristics commensurate with the ltierarclticallevel of the unit; 
3. the capability to restrict a unit to acquire sensor observations from geographic 
locations within the unit's area of influence; 
4. the capability to describe sensor-to-unit and unit-to-unit relationships due to the 
enabling technologies infrastructure, called the control architecture and denoted by an 
arrow; 
S. the capability to describe sensor-to-unit and unit-to-unit relationships a.~ prescribed by 
doctrine, called the control doctrine and dcnoted by an arrow; 
6. the capability to describe a stocha.~tic time delay of sensor infonnation associated with 
each directed sensor-to-unit and unit-to-unit link, denoted as TD()ljj.cr;j}; 
7. the capability EO describe a probability ofrccciving a message to simulate the loss of 
seIL~or infonnation associated with each directed sensor-to-unit and unit-to-unit link. 
denoted as PR(Pij); and 
8. the capability to describe a staffmg ability multiplier that is a characteristic of an 
individual unit and indicative of the unit's ability to perfonn the staff function of 
processing infonnation, denoted as SAM(a;). 
For example, given two units called Unit i and Unit j, where Unit i is not Unit j, 
and Unit i and Unit j belong to the set of all sensors and units described in the operational 
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scenario of the computer war game simulation, thc eight cOIllJXlTIents of the gencral 
control model are applied in Figure 12. 
Figure 12. GeneraJ Control ModeJ with Major Components Applied to Two Units 
Component 1 is represented by ni and llj where both Unit i and Unit j maintain 
their own perception of the environment Component 2 is represented by Unit i, which for 
this example, is a sensor and is owned by Unit j. Unit j directly receives Unit i's sensor 
infonnation. Component 3 is represented a.~ the geographic area.~ of Norrh and South 
Korea. Unit i , acting a.~ a ~ensor, is restricted to only ac4ulle sensor observations from 
Norrh Korea. The dirtxted sensor-to-urut and unit-to-unit relationships due to 
Componenl 4, enahling technologies, and Component 5, doctrine, are represented by the 
arrow between Unit i and Unit j. If a sensor-tQ-unit or unit-to-unit relationship does not 
exist because of either the control architecture, Component 4, or the control doctrine, 
Component 5, the directed flow of infonnation as represented by an arrow will nOL exist 
and the sensor observation infonnation may not flow directly between the two units. 
Component 6, the time delay of sensor infonnation, is represented in association with the 
directed arrow between Unit i and Unit j as TD(~j,crij). Component 7, the probability of 
receiving a message, is represented in association with the directed arrow between Unit i 
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and Unit j as PR(Pij). The Staffing Ability Multiplier, Component 8, is represented for 
both Uniti and Unitj as SAM(a;) and SAM(C1.j), respectively. 
Figure 5 through Figure 10 depicted in Chapter IT represent six general sensor-to-
unit and unit-to-unit relationship strucnlfcs. These six relationship structures will be used 
to test whether or not the general control model behaves in a realistic and analytically 
uscful manner when coupled with a set of parameters for time delay, probability of receipt 
and the staffmg ability multiplier. 
It is important to recall that the general control model is designed to allow an 
analyst interested in understanding thc cffects of varying control structures within an 
operational context to describe, test, and analyze any control structure of interest for the 
set of sensors and units contained in the operational scenario. Any directed, linked 
relatioIL~hip that can be described between a set of units is capable of being represented by 
the analyst. For example, an analyst can represent the flow of information in the following 
A theater owns a sensor which provides the theater sensor observations. The 
sensor-to-unit description ~-pecifics thc sensor obscrvation to arrive at a variable time in 
the future. It also specifies a variable chance of a successful and complete receipt of the 
obscrvation. The theater, upon receipt of the sensor observation, processes thc sensor 
observation while applying the theater Staffing Ability Multiplier. In rum, the theater 
passes the sensor observation onto two of six subordinate Anny units, a Navy Battle 
Group, and an allied Air Force airbase as outlined by thc unit-to-unit description with the 
unit-to-unit specified variable time delay and probability of receipl. Each unit, upon 
receipt, processes the sensor observation while applying its own specified Staffmg Ability 
Multiplicr. The two Army units send the sensor observation infonnation to their 
respective two subordinate Army units. The Navy Battle Group sends the sensor 
observation infonnation to the remainder of the group. The Air Force airbase sends the 
sensor observation to each of thc subordinate wings. 
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Each suhsequent unit receives the sensor observation acwnling to the unit-to-unit 
description of rime delay and probability of receipt pardIIleters and processes the sensor 
observation while applying the a<:sociated unit Staffmg Ability Multiplier. A description of 
the components of the general control model is given below. 
1. Individual Perceptions 
The first component of the general control model is the capability for units to 
maintain their own, individual perceptions of the battlefield environment and the enemy 
course of action (COA). lbis enables the realistic quality that different units may hold 
differing views of the enemy, and plan and potentially execute differing courses of action 
in the absence, or delay, of timely and accurate information. Different unit types may be 
represented to include Army, Air Force, Navy, Marine, and Allied unit<:. Suhordinate 
units of an operational side can be compared to each other and the hierarchically 
controlling unit to see if perceptions and the selected enemy eourscs of action are similar 
or supporting. Furthermore, if an operational side is determined to be pursuing a similar 
course of action as evidenced hy all or a majority of the units contained on that operational 
side, the selected course of action can be compared to the enemy ground truth which i~ 
maintained in FILM. This provides a means to determine if an operational side is working 
towards a common and accurate or inaccurate goal. Additionally, if an operational side i<: 
not working towards a common goal, and one or more units have differing perceptions of 
the battlefield and believe the enemy is pursuing different courses of action, thc possible 
cause for the perception disconnect can be traced. Changes made to the control 
architecture, control doctrine, probability andlor timeline.~s of receiving the sensor 
observation information, the staffing ability multiplier, or any combination of these 
components will impact on the ability for an operational side to share a similar perception 
of the battlefield. TIle consequences of units sharing, or not sharing, the "commanders 
intent" can he determined with the foundation capability for units to maintain their own, 
individual perceptions of the battlefield environment and the enemy course of action 
(COA). 
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2. Unit Ownership Of Sensor Assets 
The second component of the general control model is the capability to describe 
unit ownership of sensor assets and specify the sensor characteristics commensurate with 
the hierarcltieal level of the unil. Each sensor is of a type which is defmed by the 
equipment types it can perceive and the sensor standard deviation by equipment type when 
perceiving that equipment type. A unit may own a sensor, meaning that when the unit 
makes a detection, the unit has the ability to send out a sensor to ref me the information 
regarding the detection. The sensor observes the location where the detection occurred 
and reports back to the unit For the analysis in this thesis, only one sensor type will be 
used to ensure that the effects due to different sensor types with different capabilities do 
not confound the results. 
3. Acquire Sensor Observation<; 
The third component of the general control model is the capability to restrict a unit 
to acquire sensor observations from geographic locations within the unit's area of 
influence. Units will be deflned according to the geographic area where they might 
possibly receive sensor observations. Not L'VCry unit will traverse L'Very key geographic 
feature contained in the area of operations. Units can be restricted to a finite and li~ted set 
of geographic areas where they might possibly receive sensor observations. 
The capability to restrict a unit to acquire sensor observations from geograpltic 
locations within the unit's area of influence presents a more realistic represeotation and 
prohibits a unit from recciving a sensor report from a geographic area outside of the unit's 
area of interest. 
4. Control Architecture 
The fourth component of the general control model is the capability to describe 
sensor-to-unit and unit-to-unit relationships due to the enabling technologies 
infrastructure, called the control architecture. Table 6 represents the structure of the 
control architecture matrix and is used to conveniently show wbo can talk to whom. 
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Table 6. Example of a Control Architecture Matrix 
For this example. Sensor 1 can only communicate with Theater A. as indicated by 
the fIrst entry identifier of "1", The second entry, mCllij,O"ij). represents the stochastic 
time delay and the third entry, PR(Pij), represcntq thc stocha.~tic probability of receipt. 
Entries with a ',(l" indicate that sensor-to-unit or unit-to-unit direct enabling technology 
does not exist. For exampie, Division 2 cannot communicate directly with Division 1. 
However, a path exist<; through Ibeater A for Division 2 to provide information to 
Division 1. This path has the potential to lengthen the time delay and decrease the 
probability of receipt 
Each of thc potential sensor-to-unit and unit-to-unit links suffers from the 
consequences of a time delay associated with staff processing and the possible loss of the 
message associated with a probability of receipt. whether the loss occurs on the air wavt!S 
or within a tactical operations center due to human neglect. In a broad sense, the control 
architecture, the time delay, and the probability of receipt represent the third C of C3: 
communications. Communication is addressed only as a foundation upon which control 
can be studied. 
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5. Control Doctrine 
TIle fifth component of the general control model is the capability to describe 
sensor-to-unit and unit-to-unit relatiOILoffiips as prescribed hy doctrine. called the control 
doctrine. Figure 7 represents the structure of the control doctrinc matrix and is ustil La 
convcniently show who chooses to talk to whom. 
Table 7. Example of a Control Doctrine Matrix 
For example, doctrine prescribes that Division 1 may report infonnation to the 
Theater A, but to no one else. The control architecture matrix indicated that enabling 
technology existed between Division 1 and Division 2 such that the two Division have the 
capahility to communicate and can talk. However, since doctrine dictates that Division 1 
may not talk with Division 2 directly, the associated directed flow of infonnation 
represented by the arrow in Figure 12 and defIned in the control architecture matrix i~ 
deleted and is no longer considered as a viable directed link. Recall that the control 
architecture and the control doctrine capabilities may appear, at first, to be redundant. 
Keeping these two components separate will allow the analyst to describe whether the 
enabling technology or the doctrine or both prohibit a sensor-to-unit or unit-to-unit 
directed link. Only when the control architecture and the control doctrine describe a 
.~cnsor·to-unit or unit-to··unit link will a viable directed link exi~t with the associated timc 
delay and probability of receipt 
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The control doctrine represents the gencral path of achieving infonnation flow a~ 
envisioned by doctrine and the commander. It establishes the procedures for the routing 
of that information. The general control model as implemented within m~M provides a 
critical capability that USMTM requires to demonstrate potentially better, and 
consequently joint, control architectures and control doctrines to the Ministry of Defense 
and Aviation in me Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. The previous examples of a control 
architecture matri:< and a control doctrine matrix indicate that Division I "technologically" 
can and "doctrinally" chooses to receive infonnation only from Theater A. Division 2 may 
be an ally or represent a sister service; soch as an Anny divi~ion, a Marine division, an Air 
Force wing, or a Navy group where either enabling technology limitations and/or doctrine 
prohibit the transmission of infonnation directly from Division 1 to Division 2 and must 
firsl pass through Theater A. The analyst will be able to create or delete the directed 
sensor-to-unit or unit-to-unit 1inks to detennine a sufficiem or optimal control structure 
given limited resources to ohtain a similar perception of the battlefield among units on an 
operational side. 
6. Time Delay Of Sensor Infonnation 
The sixth component of the general control model is the capability to describe a 
stochastic time delay of sensor infonnation associated with each directed sensor-to-unit 
and unit-to-unit link, denoted as m{jl;j,O";j). Tune delays are represcllIed using a 
Lognunnal distribution with scale parameter ~, the mean. and shape parameter (J • the 
standard deviation. The Lognormal distribution is often used to simulate the time to 
perform some task and ensures non-negative values. (Law. 1991) A Monte Carlo process 
is used to stochastically vary the time a sensor observation spends being processed at the 
receiving unit before it can be passed to subsequent units. The analyst specifies the mean 
and standard deviation associated with each directed sensor-to-unit and unit-to-unit link. 
The mean and standard deviations units are in minutes. Future development of the control 
model can address the hardware transmission times associated with specified enabling 
tet:hnology links and add them to the headquarters processing times, the mean and 
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standard deviation associated with specified units, and a queuing model to vary the mean 
and standard deviation during times of increasing message traffic for a urnL 
7, Loss or Sensor Informalion 
The seventh component of the general control model is the capability to describe 
the probability of receiving a message to simulate the loss of sensor information associated 
with each directed sensor-to-unit and unit-to-unit link, denoted as PR(p;j). A successful 
transmission will be reflected as either a complete message received, (1), or not received, 
(0). The probability of receiving a transmission is represented using a Bernoulli 
distribution with parameter p. the mean. Thc Bernoulli distribution is often used to 
simulate the random occurrence with two possible outcomes and will ensure either a 
complete message is received or lost. (Law, 1991) A Monte Carlo process is used to 
stochastically vary the occurrence of receiving a message at the receiving unit defmed by 
the sen.~or-to-unit or unit-to-unit directed link. Future development of the control model 
can address specific mean parameter values associated with equipment reliability and 
human the staff proccss of processing information. 
8. Staffing Ability Multiplier 
The eighth component of the general control model i~ the capability to describe a 
staffing ability multiplier that is a characteristic of an individual unit and indicative of the 
unit's ability to perform the staff function of processing information, denoted as SAM(a;). 
Given that a unit has a unique identity and is capable of processing infonnation in either a 
reliable and timely fashion or in a not reliable and not timely fashion, new sensor 
information can be fused with previous perceptions to either better define the situation or 
increase the "fog of war." The staffs performance when processing infonnation i~ a 
function of explicitly defined qualities such a training. personnel fill level, and experience. 
Future developmtmlS of the control model can create a function to map these qualities into 
a Staffmg Ability Multiplier. 
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C. FUTURE THEATER LEVEL MODEL IMPLEMENTATION 
The eight components of the general control model dcfmtxl in the previous section 
havc all been integrated into thc most current version of FI'LM. Th.is section discusses lhc 
implementation of those eight components in FI"LM a.~ additions to both the executable 
code and the defining scenario network file. The scenario network file is usdl to establish 
the operational context of the simulation and i~ also used to defme the parameters required 
for the executable code to function. The eight components will be discu~sed in two parts. 
Ibe first pan will pertain to the components which change the characteristics of individual 
units. The second part will pertain to the components which define the characteristics of 
directed sensor-to-urut and unit-to-urut links. 
1. Individual Units Components 
0) lruJi"idual Perceptions 
1be first component of the general control model implemented into FILM 
is the capability for units to maintain their own, individual perceptions of the battlefield 
environment and the enemy course of action (eOA). FILM: uses sensor ohservations to 
build a perception of the enemy force's rype and si7.c and then to estimate the enemy's 
prosecuted coursc of action based upon the accumulated sensor observations. The 
following two subsections arc a swnmary from the study by Karl Schmidt describing 
FILM. (Schmidt, 1993) 
(1) Enemy Force's Type and Sire 
The frrst step in building a perception of the enemy force 's type and 
size is to compute the mean mj(ui, N, t), and variance, Vj(u;, N, t), of the total nwnber of j-
assets of Ui units of type i, at node N, at time t. This computation is a two part process. 
First, the ground truth mean and standard deviation of the enemy unit assets are estimated. 
Second, the observed mean and standard deviation of the enemy unit assets are estimated. 
The ground truth mean is calculated using the mean number of 
a.~sets of type j that are with a unit of type i, denoted U;j . and the standard deviation of the 
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number of assets of type j thal are with a unit of type i, denoted O";J. The parameters CX;J 
and O"iJ are tabled counl~ of all j-assets associated with units of type i prior to combat and 
are similar to a standard military Table of Organization and Equipment (TOE). These 
par.uneters arc referred to by FILM as TOE values. 
Ground truth is estimated by a random draw for each unit for each 
j-asset from a nonnal distribution with a mean and standard deviation from the TOE 
values. The normal distribution is used in FrLM predominantly because of its ability to 
provide an approximation to a counting distribution, such as the binomial, and for 
mathematical convenience. The draw represents the actual number of assets of type j that 
will be in the respective uniL It is rounded to the nearest integer, or to >!.ero for negative 
draws. The TOE standard deviation value is used 10 represent the number of j-assets for 
each unit 
This process is used to compute the mean and variance of the total 
number of j-assets of U -unit combination.~ at node N. at time t based upon the unit TOE 
valucs. The computed means and variances are: 
""~ 







u i is the number of units of type i and they are summed from one to the total number of 
unit types, denoted tatun. Ii rcpresenl~ the sets of unit type combinations and is writteu 
as a vector equal to the number of units by unit type. For example. let Ii = (0 light 
infantry units, 4 annor unil~, 2 mechanized units). 
Next, the observation of the j-asscl~ of a unit of type i on a node N 
must be computed. A sensor which makes the observation has a list of attributes which 
describe ils capabilities. The description consists of a sensor standard deviation which 
provides the error associated with the observation of a type j-asset. The standard 
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deviation, 'tj(s;N; t), is a function of the sensor type s in addition LO the asset uf type j, 
the node N, and the time of day t. Tune of day reflects whether the sensor is observing 
during the day or the night. 
An estimate is made of the numhcrs and types of wnts at node N. 
The sensor of type s from the set of aiL sensors S must determine the total number of j-
assets at node N. A nonual distribution is specified using the mean equal to the ground 
truth mean of the nllmber of j-asscLS of all the units at nude N along with the standard 
deviation of the sensor, 't j (s;N; t). Again, a random numlx:r is drawn from the specified 
nonnal distribution to become the number of j-asscLS at node N, at time t; denoted x j(t). 
These observations are assumed to be independent in FTLM. The sensor observations are 
combined in vector form and written as: 
x(t) = (X t (t\x2 (t) . .... . X) (tl) (3) 
where J represents the total nwnber of j-asset-types. These sensor observations arc used 
to compute the posterior distrihution of the number and type of writs at a node and i<> 
subsequently passed on to determine the perception of the enemy COA discussed in 
subsection (2). 
Before the posterior distribution of the perception of the number 
and type of units at node N can be calculated, the initial prior distribution of each possible 
grouping of units at node N must be specified. The initial prior distribution uses the 
unllOllll distribution over the set of all possible groupings of units at a node thereby 
defming each grouping as equally likely. 
Equation 4 gives the Bayesian posterior den.sily for a mixture of 
nonnal distrihutions. Ibis posterior distribution represents the updated probahility of the 
number and type of unil~ at a node N. Note thai the new sensor observation is referred to 
as x(t + 1) and i(t) refers to the past sensor observations. The product over j refers to 
those asset types detected by the sensor where c is the nOffilalizing constant. 
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II Wliti (ii,x(t+ l);t+l;N) = 
(4) 
In addition to computing the posterior distribution, the groups of 
conditional moments of each asset type j which the sensor can detect, given the 
configuration of unit types at a node N, must be computed. If a sensor cannot obselVe an 
asset type, that conditional moment remains the same. The conditional momenl~ are: 
v 2(ii;x;N;t+l) _ v/(ii;x;N;t)*'t/(s;N;t) 
J v/(ii;x;N;t)+'t/(s;N;t) 
(6) 
These conditional moments, along with the posterior distribution in 
(4), are used to update the perception of the number and type of enemy a%el~ unit types 
with each subsequent sensor observation. 
(2) Enemy Course of Actiou 
The development of the computations used to provide a perception 
of the enemy coursc of action is similar to the preceding discussion. Essential to 
de!ennining the enemy COA is the defmition of a COA. A COA consists of one or morc 
avenues of approach which consists of more than one route. Each routc consists of transit 
node~ and physical nodes. There may be multiple COAs and each may be very different or 
very similar, depending upon the scheme.~ of mancuver, the objlX:tives, the Wlit 
combinations associated with each route, or a combination of each mentioned attribute. 
COAs arc represented by c and belong to the set of all COAs called C. 
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Three items are required for the initial calculation and the following 
perception updates, referred to as nCOA (c;k+l). These items include the prior 
probability distribution of the enemy COA, IICOA (c; k), of COA c, for the interval [k.6., 
(k+l).6.] ; the variance of the error of thc lib sensor observation, 't n} (I) , as I goes from I 
to bk(N) ; and the sensor observation on node N, or asset j, SI(N,j,k), for all the 
bk(N)sensorobservations in the interval [k.6., (k+l).6.]. 
Ihe initial prior probability distribution of the enemy eOA is 
distributed unifonn ovcr thc number in the set C of COAs. lbis provides an initial equally 
likely probahility with each potential COA. Ihe variance of the error of the lib. sensor 
comes fro m the FfLM Scenario Data File Record which describes sensor attributes. 
'[n,/(I) for the lib sensor ohscrvation is assigned the sensor standanl deviation for the 
sensor type used for the lib observation. Tbe sensor type standard deviation, 't j (s; N; t) , 
was discussed in the previous subsection. 
Perceptions arc updated in FTLM at a fixed time interval 
designated by the llSer-analyst. The perceptions of the enemy COA~ arc updllted 
regardless of detection. At the J.(h perception update cycle, bk (N) sensor observations are 
taken at node N. The sensor ohservations, Xj(t), have been defmed in the previous 
section. The accnmulation of the sensor observations between perception npdates, [Jul, 
(k+l)li] where.6. is the user-analyst defmed update time interval, is defined as sl (N,j,k). 
I is the lib ordered sensor observation from 1 to bk (N). 
The computation of the perception update in FILM is composed of 
the perceived mean and variance of the numbers ofj-a~.~et~ at node N, for perception cycle 




It is important to note that I resets itself at the start of each new perception update cycle. 
FrLM surveys all nodes that can be occupied during the time interval [lcl. (k+l)A] for 
each avenue of approach (AA), Potentially occupied nodes are referred to as N(AA;k). 
Subsequently, the model computes the perceived means and variances of the total number 
of observed j-assct~ over the entire avenue of approach during the interval [kil, (k+l)A] 
using the potentially occupied nodes and the mean and variance a.~sociated with the 







Next, the momcnt~ of the total number of all units using avenue of 
approach AA, under course of action c. during the interval [lcl, (k+l)l!.l. is defined as a 
mean value using the TOE values previously discussed and is referred to as I1j(AA,k,c). 
The standard deviation is calculated as 10 percent of the mean and is referred to as 
O'j(AA,k,c). 
A unit nonnal density function is used to compute a nonnal 
distribution using the previously mentioned mean and standard deviation. 
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(11) 
It is important to note that the value of this nonnal distribution is 1.0 if no ob.<;crvations 
are made during the interVal [k,1., (k+l)6]. 
Finally, the posterior distribution representing the probability that 
the enemy is using eOA c during the interval[kA, (k+l)6] is defined as: 
IlCOA (o;k» IlIl <j(AA,k,c) 
rrFlNALCDA(c;k+ 1) AA j (12) 
UNm LIlmA(c;k»IlIl~j(AA,k, ,) 
C AAj 
Note that the stun of all eOA probabitities is one. The Bayesian posterior distribution 
represents the updated probability of the perceived enemy course of action. The Bayesian 
posterior distribution applied in association with the general control model reflects the 
posterior distribution is for a specitled unit i. The set from which unit i draws includes the 
theater and each divisional unit as defined in the operational scenario. Each combat, 
naval, or airbase unit has the capability to maintain its own perception. (Schmidt, 19(3) 
b) Unit Ownership Of Sensor Asset~· 
The second component of the general control model implemented into 
FfLM i.~ the capability to describe unit ownership of sen.sor a~set~ and specify the sensor 
characteristics commensurate with the hierarehicallevel of the unit Table R represcnts a 
sensor-to-unit data structure from a FILM Scenario Data File Record. 
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Table 8. Sensor-To-Unit Data Structure 
The sensor-to-unit data poroon of the scenario network file describes unit 
ownership of sensors by type (Yamauchi, 1994, Section 35). Appendix A contains an 
extract from a FILM Scenario Data File Recorn.. 
In Table 8, a theater unit called Red, column two, owns and receive.~ 
sensor reports from a sensor of type Red.Sens.l, column one. Red.Sens.l is defined 
ebewhere in the scenario network file (Yamauchi, 1994, Section 13). The remainder of 
the colwnns arc explained later in this chapter. Refer to the thesis by Carl Schmidt for a 
complete explanation of sensors (Schmidt, 1993). 
c) Sensor Observations 
The third component of the general control model implemented into FILM 
is the capability to restrict a unit to acquire sensor observations from geographic locations 
within the unit's area of influence. The following is an abbreviated excerpt from a FILM 
scenario network ftle that describes this component 




'" end of who receives sensor reports - start sensor-ta-unit data 
The "start who receives sensor reports" portion of the scenario network file lists 
the units capable of receiving sensor observations of a specified geographic location. 
FILM is based upon a physical node and tran~it node representation of the geographic 
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area of interest. (Schmidt, 1993) The flrst entry in this portion of the scenario network file 
is the number of nodes capable of being ohserved hy other than the controlling theater 
unit. In this example only one node may be observed by the divisional units. The second 
entry is the name of the node, or geDgraphie location. In this example the city of 
Pyongyang L~ described. The third entry is the number of divL~ional unit~ capable of 
observing Pyongyang. In this example only one unit will be listed which can observe 
Pyongyang. The fourth entry L~ the name of the division capable of observing Pyongyang. 
In this example Red.Div.1 is capable of observing Pyongyang. (Yamauchi, 1994, Section 
34) 
d) Staffing Ahility Multiplier 
The eighth component of the general control model implemented into 
FILM L~ the capability to describe a Staffing Ability Multiplier that is a characteristic of an 
individual unit and indicative of the unit's ability to perfoon the staff function of 
processing infonnation, denoted as SAM(a;). "nus paper will use thn:e categories for the 
Staffing Ability Multiplier: one less than 1.0 to tighten the associated standard deviation of 
the new sensor observation ahout the ground truth number of units by type which the 
Bayesian posterior distribution is using as the mean, one at 1.0 which effect:; no change to 
the nonna] update computation, and one greater than 1.0 to spread the associated standard 
deviation of the new sensor observation about the growld truth number of uniL~ by type 
which the Bayesian posterior distribution is using as the mean. This thesjs wilJ detennine 
if the Staff"mg Ability Multiplier behaves in a consistent manner and is worth additional 
future research. 
Mathematically increasing or decreasing the sensor variance by a multiplier 
will either tighten or spread the new observation estimate from the sensor. "[his i~ 
convenient since rbe Bayesian update cycJe centers about the ground truth number of units 
by type. This tightening or spreading of the new observation estimate by the unit 
simulates the unit processing of the sensor infonnation more or less effectively as it is 
combined with the prior of the Bayesian perception update cycle. 
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The following equation represents the Staffing Ability Multiplier change 
made to the posterior distribution for Unit i, previously discussed in subsection (a). 
(13) 
When Unit i updates it~ perception of the enemy COA, it applic.~ the 
Staffing Ability Multiplier, (Ii, to the sensor variance of the sensor type which is assigned 
to the lIb sensor observation. TIlls occurs for every sensor observation Unit i receives, 
either direcLly from a scnsor or from another unit. The remainder of the perception update 
cycle is unchanged from the previons discussion. The Staffing Ability Multiplier is 
associated with units and is described in the unit description portion of the scenario 
network file. The Staffing Ability Multiplier must be a real nwnber greater than zero. 
(Yarnauchi, 1994, Sections 24, 25, 26, & 27) 
2. Directed Link Components 
The fourth, fifth, sixth, and seventh components of the general control model 
implemented in FILM define the characteristics of the directed links. Table 9 represents 
these four cornponent~ as a data structure from a FILM Sccnario Data File Record.. 
Table 9. Unit-To-Unit Data Structure 
a) Control Architecture 
The fourth component of the general control model implemented into 
l'TLM is the capahility to describe sensor-to-unit and unit-w-unit relationships due to Ihe 
enabling technologies infrastructure, called the control archittcture. The third colwun 
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entry of Table 9, Control Architecture, describes the control architecture. If the entry is 
one, the sensor or unit in the first column can communicate with the unit in the second 
column, and zero otherwL~e. In this examplf\ Red has a directed, enabling technology 
communications capability with Red.Div.I. (yamauchi, 1994, Section 35) 
To prevent a cycle from occurring and the same sensor observation 
information being posted to the Bayesian posterior distribution, a flag is used within 
FILM to ensure that a message L~ not received and processed more than once if the 
specified control architecture matrix describes a cycle. 
b) Control Doctrine 
The fifth component of the general control model implemented into FILM 
is the capability to describe sensor~to-unit and unit-to-unit relationships as prescribed by 
doctrine, called the control doctrine. The fourth column entry of Table 9, Control 
Doctrine, describes the contra! doctrine. If the entry L~ one, the sensor or unit in the frrst 
column chooses to communicate with the unit in the second column, and zero otherwise. 
In this example, doctrine specifies that Red share information with Red.Div.L (yamauchi, 
1994, Section 35) 
c) Time Delay Of Sen.YOT Information 
The sixth component of the general control mooel implemented into FILM 
is the capability to describe a stochastic time delay of sensor information associated with 
each directed sensor-to-unit and unit-to-unit link, denottil as TD(!lij,cri), The fifth and 
sixth column entries of Table 9, Time Delay Mean and Standard Deviation, describe the 
parameters of the LogtlOnnal distribution associated with the specified sensor-to-unit and 
unit-to-unit directed link described hy the first and second column. The fifth column entry 
specifies !-\. the mean. The mean time delay must be greater than zero and is in minutes. 
The sixth column entry specifies cr, the standard deviation. The time delay standard 
deviation must be greater than zero and L~ in minutes. In this example, the mean of the 
time delay between Red and Red.Div.1 L~ 10 minutes with a standard deviation of 1 
minute. (Yamauchi, 1994. Section 35) 
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d) Loss Of Sensor Information 
The seventh component of the general control model implemented into 
FrLM is the capability to describe the probability of receiving a message to simulate the 
loss of sensor infonnation associated with each directed sensor-to-unit and unit-to-unit 
link, deuoted as PR(pij). TIle seventh column entry of Table 9, Probability of Rff:cipt, 
describe.~ the parameter of the Bernoulli disttibution associated with the specified sensor-
to-unit and unit-to-unit directed link described by the first and second columns, 
respectively. The seventh column entry specifies p, the probability mean. The probability 
of receipt mean must be a real number in the range of zero to one. In this example, the 
probability of receipt mean is 1.0 between Red and Red.Div.1. This sirnulatc.~ that 
Red.Div.1 receives all messages from Red. (Yamauchi, 1994 Section 35 & 36) 
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lV. RESULTS AND ANALYSIS 
11lis chapter presents the result~ from the test design discussed in Chapter II and 
detennincs whether or not the general control model, as implemented in FILM and 
discussed in Chapter ill, is consistent with representing a realistic simulation capability of 
battlefield control. 
The results will be presented and diseussed in three parts, 'Ihe first part will 
address the test run of the two sets of replications for the base case and each of the 
alternative cases. 'Ihe first set of replications will consist of a simple test run using just 
two units with individual perceptions; the theater and a combat unit. TIle second set of 
replications will consist of a more rigorous test run using eleven units with individual 
perceptions: the theater, six combat units, three naval units, and an airbase. 
The second part will address the variations in parameters for the characterization 
of time delays, probabilities of receipt, and unit staffing abilities with infonnation. The 
applicable parameters will be varied to detennine the effect they cause during the course 
of a replication and their propensity to reflect realism of the characteristics they intend to 
model. 
The third part will be an excursion to determine the limitations associated with 
increasing the number of units with individual perceptions and the amount of time required 
to run the replication. A composite case representing a few of the defined cases in 
Chapter II will also be discussed to show the robust capability to model various control 
representations. 
The results for each test run replication will he presented in the fonn of a dum. 
Each chart will display the trends associated with the unit perceptions of the Red ground 
truth course of action over time in days. Because the purpose of thi~ analysis is to 
demonstrJ.te the similarity or dissimilarity between trcnd~ in unit pereeptions, the 
magnimde of the COA probabilities arc not included. Furthermore, the computer 
algorithms used to compute the COA updates have not yet been subjected to rigorous 
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verification. Since thc analysis is only concerned with determining similarities in the 
correct perception of the battlefield, this chart representation is an adequate means to 
display the results. An audit can be made between a unit's changing perception, and the 
sensor-to-unit or unit-to-unit sensor ohservations, using the sensor observation history file 
which is available for each replication. Appendix B contains an extract from a sensor 
observation history file. FILM is designed to provide the analyst all information on the 
replication which is produced within the simulation. Selecting the optional history file 
record to be generated and selecting sensor observations, each replication will provide the 
analyst the audit capability. Sensor observation history files can be anywhere from a few 
hundred pages to a few thousand pages depending upon the number of units with 
individual perceptions and the control representation. The sensor obscrvation history 
reflects each sensor observation that is made, from thc initial detection to the passing of 
that sensor observation between units as defined by the control representation in the 
scenario network filc. 
A. TEST RUN 
1. Two-Unit Test Run of Korean Scenario 
a) Case I 
Case 1 is shown in Figure 13. For Case 1, both unit~ have sensors and 
infonnation which is shared higher-to-lower and lower-to higher. 
The chart shows that both units share the same perception for the duration 
of the test run. Both units begin at time zero with an equal probability of the three 
possible courses of action. When presented more than one course of action, FILM 
currently uses the notion of equally probable amongst all courses of action for the initial 
start of the simulation. In this case, since there are three COAs, a Blue unit initially 
perceives each of them initially to be equally possible. Each chart presented in this 
research has units initially perceiving each COA to be equally probable. 
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The following is an explanation of the curves represented on a Figure 13. 
Recall that cach curvc represcnts a Blue unit's perccption that it correctly perceives the 
Red ground truth COA. Time increments and the associated perception probability value 
coincide with COA updates which are set to occur every 6 hours or 0.25 days. 
Gase 1 - Parameter Set 1 - 2 Units 
Ti me In Days 
Figure 13. Case 1, Two Units 
At time zero, each unit perceives the growld truth COA with an equally 
likely prior. At time 0.25 days, Blue Theater makes its first detection on transit node 112. 
It immediately schedules a sensor to go to the physical node where the detectiou occurred. 
Blue Sensor observes a Red unit on transit node 112 and counts 48 tankers and 76 
flatbeds from a logistics unit<>. Transit node 112 is occupied in ground truth by a Red 
logistics unit with 45 tankers and 76 flatbeds. lbe observed count of the assets by type 
for a logistics unit is very close to the ground truth. The following i~ an explanation of the 
application of this sensor infonnation to the Bayesian plJsterior disnibution for a mixture 
of Nonnal distributions associated with Blue Theater. 
Once the observation, in the fonn of a count of assets by asset type of a 
uni t by unit type. ha.~ been made for a specified node; a comparison of the expected asset 
count by asset type of a unit by unit type fo r that node is made for each COA. This 
comparison uses the Bayesian distrihution to record and maintain the infonnation in the 
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form of a posterior. If the comparison of the observed count to the expected count yields 
a small deviation, meaning the two counts are similar, and after normalization by the 
variance of the expected count of assets of a unit type and the variance of the sensor, a 
relatively large number occurs within the range of zero to one. This process is performed 
for each asset count by asset type of a Wlit-by-unit type for a specified node. Each 
comparison is combined as a product If all the observed count~ of assets are similar to 
the expected asset counts, a product consisting of relatively large numbers close to one 
results. The resulting product, called the posterior, i.~ the probability that the observing 
unit perceives that eGA as ground truth. 'Ibis occurs for each of the eGAs. 
Described in the FrLM Scenario Data FIle is a listing by eGA of the 
avenues of approach and the corridors to be used by unit for that eGA. Each avenue of 
approach and corridor consists of nodes and expected units by unit lype to be found on 
thnse nodes. '\Vhen the observed information is compared to the first e~A, in this case 
eOA One, a query is made to determine if the node where the ohservation was taken is 
contained in the description of the eGA as part of an avenue of approach or corridor. 
Once it is determined that trdIlsit J 12 is contained in eOA One, a comparison is made by 
asset type and by urnt type. 
If a node is contained in multiple eOAs, overlap occurs which may cause 
confusion when comparing a unit's perception to ground truth. If the expected asset 
count hy asset type of a unit-by-unit type is similar between two or more eOAs, there i.~ a 
chance that the observation may he closer, providing smaller deviation when compared to 
the expected count, to a eGA which is not the ground truth. The sensor observation is 
stochastic and is influenced by the standard deviation of the sensor. Generally, good 
sensors with smaller standard deviations will provide observations closer to the ground 
truth than poor sensors with large standard deviations. This realistic modeling of sensor 
infonnation is the reason why charts later in this chapter will depict a unit perceiving the 
ground truth eGA with near certainty, and suddenly perceiving the ground troth eOA 
wito. a smaller probability. 
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Tn Case 1, the node and the associated expected asset count is clearly 
defmed as part of COA One. This process occurs for observations by Blue Theater on 
transit nodes 109, lID, 113, 111, and physical node Pyongyang. Group.2-1 makes one 
observation of physical node Haeju. Each observation results in comparisons with small 
deviations from the expeL'te(\ asset count. A few of the observations arc on nodes with 
expected asset counts which arc clearly defined for COA One. The result of these 
observations and the comparisons using the Bayesian posterior disnibution by e OA 
update at time 0.5 days is that Blue Theater perceives the ground truth eOA with a 
posterior probability near certainty. After each sensor observation and subsequent 
perception update, the posterior becomes the prior for the next perception update. 11ri.s 
allows the previous perception to be remembered along with the current infonnation. 
Once a strong opinion is fonned by the posterior, a value close to one, it requires 
substantial sensor observations to decrease the posterior value. 
TIris audit process can be perfonned for the remainder of chart u~ing the 
836 page history file of sensor observation infonnation for this one simulation run. The 
initial five days of the scenario represents a logistics build-up by North Korea. The 
majority of sensor activity, and therefore observations concerns logistic units. Battle does 
not begin until thc start of the sixth day. As combat units, in this case Group.2-l. begin to 
maneuver according to the scripted counter eOA, detectiuns OCL'Uf which cause 
ohservations on physical nodes that decrease the posterior value associated with the 
ground truth eOA. nus occurs because of the overlap of physical nodes and the expected 
cowlt of assets by asset type and by writ type for more than one eOA. in this scenario, 
eOA One and Two are very similar. Many of the nodes and the expected units are vcry 
similar. This makes it difficult to detennine which is the currect COA to perceive and the 
model represents this confusion realistically. 
At COA update time day 7.0, the Blue units still perceive the ground truth 
eOA with near certainty. Observations occur on ncxlcs defmed for both eOA One and 
eOA Two and by eOA update time day 7.25, Blue perceives Red's ground truth eOA as 
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shown in Figure 13. By eOA update time 7.5, Blue's perceptions have changed, as 
indicated in the figure. Observations after this time occur on nodes more clearly defmed 
for COA One, and the chart depicts the Blue units perception of the groWld truth COA to 
increase towards certainty. 
Auditing the history fiJe and observing the chart, the units are sharing the 
information according to the Case 1 control representation. Once a sensor observation is 
received by the owning unit, that unit sends the information to the other unit as described 
by the control representation. Each transmittal can be checked using the audit process. 
The slight lag by the division is appropriate considering the parameters for thc time delay 
when receiving a sensor observation from the theater. The units in Case 1 behave in 
accordance with the intent of the control representation. 
b) Case 2 
Case 2 is shown in Figure 14. For Case 2, both units have sensors und 
information which is shared highcr-to-lowcr. Thc theater perceives only according to its 
own sensor observations while the division has both its own sensor observations and, 
eventually, the theater sensor observations. Note that if there were more than one 
divisional uniL, divisional sensor observations would not be shared and each division 
wouk! perceive only according to its own sensor observations and the theater 
observations. 
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case 2· Parameter Set 1 - 2 Units 
Time in Days 
Figure 14. Case 2, Two Units 
The chart shows that both units share the same perception for the dumtion 
of the test run. Again, both unit~ begin at time zero with an equal likelihood of the three 
enemy COAs. As in Case 1, Blue Theater detects a Red unit on a physical node at time 
0.25 days. The same description of events as discussed in Case 1 applies to Case 2 and 
will not be repeated. Auditing the history files show that the majority of observations are 
being made by Blue Theater which is not restricted to a limited set of physical and transit 
nodes which it can sense. Blue Theater can send sensors to any defined location in the 
simulation. The s.imilarity suggests that Blue Theater observations arc predominantly 
influencing the posterior for all units who receive the observations, in this case Group.2- 1, 
and this i~ indeed the case when reviewing the history file. The units in Case 2 appear to 
behave in accordance with the intent of the control representation given only one 
divisional uniL 
c) Ca.~e.l 
Case 3 is shown in Figurc 15. For Case 3. both units have sensors and 
information is shared lower-to higher. The division perceives only according to its own 
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sensor observations while the theater has both its own sensor observations and, eventually, 
the division sensor observations_ Note that if there were more than one divisional unit, 
divisional sensor observations would nOl be shared and each division would still only 
perceive according to its own sensor observations. The theater is a composite perception 
of all available sensor infonnatiOiL 
Case 3 - Parameter Set 1 - 2 Units 
Time In Days 
Figure 15. Case 3, Two Units 
The chart shows that both units do not share the same perception for the 
duration of the test run. Again, at time 0.25 days, Blue Theater receives the scnsor 
observations as previously discussed throughout the run of the simulation. However, at 
time 0.5 days, Group.2-1 detects a Red unit which is occupying a physical node within its 
area of influence. This observation and the associated count of assets by asset type and by 
unit type contributes to the eOA update cycle in sueh a way to indicate that Group.2-1 
perceives a course of action other than the ground truth eOA. The physical node is 
defined similarly for two eOA~. 1his is represented by the posterior associated with the 
ground truth eGA which decreases at time 0.75 days. 1his sensor observation 
infonnation is sent to Blue Theater, but Blue Theater continues to reccive numerous 
sensor observations whieh suppmt thc eOA One posterior. The single Group.2-1 sensor 
observation was insufficient to alter Blue Thcater'li pcrccption. 
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Prior to time 1.0 days, Group.2-1 observes another node uniquely defmed 
in eOA One. The count of assets on that node is sufficient to increase the posterior of the 
ground truth e~A. After time 1.0 days, Group.2-1 receives another sensor observation 
on a physical node similarly defined for two COAs. This results in a subsequent decrease 
in the perception of the ground truth eGA. No additional sensor observations are made 
by Group.2-1 until time 7.0 days. Recall that at time 6.0 days, the logL~tics build-up is 
over and combat has begun. Group.2-1 receives a sensor observation which is sufficient 
to cause a shift in perception for both Blue Theater and for Group.2-1. Blue Theater 
being influenced by this observation is in part due to luck in choosing Group.2-1 to own a 
sensor and have the ability to share infonnation with Blue Theater. If another sub-unit had 
been chosen, the results could be very different, either due to no contact, or contact very 
similar to previous Blue Theater contact with Red. 
Audit of the history file shows that the sensor observations by Group.2-1 
after time 7.0 days greatly influence Blue Theater's perception. Note that the shift~ in 
perception do occur at approximatcly the same time and in the same direction once 
combat has begun due to Group.2-I's relative level of contact with Red unit~. Blue 
Theater is updating its perception with Group.2-1 provided sensor repons. The posteriors 
held by the two unit~ are different because the priors at time 7.0 days were different. 
Considering Case 2 of the same scenario where the direction ofinfonnation 
flow between the theater and the division is higher-to-lower, it becomes apparent that the 
theater observations were indeed influencing the division more strongly than the division 
observations influencing lhe theater. This was due to the larger proportion of Blue 
Theater ohservations to Group.2-1 observations. 
The audit process indicates that the units in Case 3 behave in accordance 
with the intent of the control representation. 
d) Case 4 
Case 4 is shown in Figure 16. For Case 4, only the division has a sensor 
and infonnation is shared lower-to higher. The division perceives only according to its 
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own sensor observations and the theater perceives only according to the same divisional 
sensor observations. Note that if there were more than one divisional unit, divisional 
sensor observations would not be shared and each division would perceive onJy according 
to its own sensor observations. The theater is a composite perception of all available 
sensor infonnation. 
Case 4 - Parameter Set 1 - 2 Units 
Time in Days 
Figure 16. Case 4, Two Units 
The chart shows that both Illlits share thc same perception for the duration 
of the test run. llris simulation run is similar to Group.2-1's behavior in Case 3. The 
difference in Group.2-1's perception in Case 4 occurs at time 1.25 days, Group.2-1 
receives a sensor observation on a physical node located in two COAs. Due to the 
stochastic process of the sensor observation, the observation count of assets is sufficient 
to result in a small posterior for thc ground truth COA. Auditing the history file shows 
that the posterior associated with the ground truth COA is maintained for the remainder of 
the simulation since the few subsequent observations occur on nodes defined similarly for 
COA One and eOA Two 
Blue Theater onJy receives the infonnation from Group.2-1. Auditing the 
history file shows that each time Group.2-1 receives a sensor observation, the infonnation 
is passed to Blue Theater. Both units maintain the same posterior for the run of the 
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simulation. Thi.~ result~ in Blue Theater perceiving exactly as Group.2-1 as indicated by 
the overlapping curves in the chart. 
"Ine units in Case 4 behave in accordance with the intent of the control 
representation given only one divisional unit. It is necessary to look at the multi-divisional 
test run for Case 4 to see if the composite perception held by the theater better reflects the 
ground truth COA given a multi-sensor control representation. 
e) CaseS 
Case 5 is shown in Figure 17. For Case 5, only the theater has a sensor 
and infonnation i.~ share{] higher-to-lower. The theater perceives only according to it~ 
own sensor ohscrvation.~ and the division perceives only according to the same theater 
sensor observations. Note that if there were more than one divisional unit. each division 
would receive all the available sensor observation information since there is only one 
sensor in this control representation. Both the theater and the division maintain a 
composite perception of all available sensor information. The chart shows that hoth units 
share the same perception for the duration of the test run. 
Case 5 - Parameter Set 1 - 2 Units 
Time In Days 
Figure 17. Case 5, Two Units 
Case 5 is similar to Ca.'\C 1 which has been discussed in detail. The 
differences occur in two places. The observation discussed in Case 1 prior to time 0.5 
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days made by Group.2-1 does not occur in Ca;;e 5 since Group.2-1 does not own a sensor 
in this case. The omission of this single sensor observation results in no changc. . between 
the two cases. Blue Theater makes the same observations on nodes similarly defined in 
two COAs which result in a decreasing posterior for the ground truth eOA by time 7.5 
days. However, the observation made in ease 1 by Group.2- 1 at time 7.5 days does not 
have the opportunity to occur since Group.2-1 does not own a sensor in ease 5. As a 
result, the subsequent increase in the posterior of the ground truth eOA does not occur. 
By time 8.0 days, Blue Theater's posterior for the ground truth eGA has further 
decreased. 
Auditing the history file shows that the units in Case 5 behave in 
accordance with the intent of the control representation. 
f) Case 6 
Case 6 is shown in Figure 18. For Case 6, both units have ~nsors but they 
do not share information. The theater perceives only according to its own sensor 
observations while the division perceives only according to its own sensor observations. 
Note that if there were more than one divisional unit, divisional sensor observations would 
not be shared and each division would perceive only according to its own sensor 
observations. There is no composite perception of all available sensor information. The 
chart shows that both unil~ do not share the same perception for the duration of the test 
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case 6 - Parameter Set 1 - 2 Units 
Time in Days 
Figure 18. Ca.<;e 6, Two Units 
Case 6 is a combination of Case 5 for Blue Theater and Case 4 for 
Group.2~ 1. Looking at Blue Theater's curve in Case 5 where Blue Theater only has 
information from its own sensor and comparing it to Blue Theater's curve in Case 6, there 
is a remarkable similarity. Auditing the history file shows that the sensor observation~ arc 
the same as in Case 5, with slight differences due to the stochastic process of the sensor 
modeL The difference occurs at time 7.75 where Blue Theater makes an observation on a 
node contained in two COAs and in this simulation run, the deviations from the expected 
counts for that node in COA One are smaller than the deviations for the expected counts 
for COA Two. The two different curves show the randomness eausC(\ hy the stochastic 
process of the sensor count on similarly defined nodes. In one case, COA Two is more 
probahle; in the other case, eOA One is more probable. 
Looking at Group.2-1's curve in Case 4 where Group.2-1 only ha.~ 
information from it~ own sensor and comparing it to Group.2- 1's curve in Case 6, there is 
a also remarkable similarity. Auditing the history file shows that the behavior is the same 
as discussed for Blue Theater. TIle differences occur at time 7.0 days where subsequent 
observations occur Oil nodes Similarly ddined for more than one COA. 'ibis results in the 
inerease and decrease of the posterior associated with the ground truth e~A. 
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Auditing the history file shows that each unit is receiving sensor reports 
exclusively from the sensor the unit owns. No information is bcing shared_ Thls resulv; in 
the two distinct perceptions of the enemy ground truth COA. If Group.2-1 had been 
associated with nodes that the Blue Theater observed, the resulting posteriors may have 
been more similar to Blue Theater. Ca.~e 2 behaves in accordance with the intent of the 
control representation. 
2. Eleven-Unit Test Run or Korean Scenario 
The detailed level of discussion for the two-unit test runs of the Korean Scenario 
will not be used to evaluate the eleven-unit test runs. Each history file for the two Wlit 
test runs range from 300 pages to 900 pages. The history files associated with the eleven 
unit test run are over 2000 pages. The intent of this portion of the analysis of the results is 
to determine whether the control representations are behaving as one would expect them 
to behave given more than two units. In each of the two unit cases, the units behaved as 
inteuded by the control representation. 
a) Case 1 
Case I is shown in Figure 19. For Case I, all units have sensors and 
infonnation is shared higher-to-Iower and lower-to higher. The chart shows that all units 
share the same perception for the duration of the test run. A check using the audit process 
discussed in the previous section shows that the units are updating their posu:riors of the 
ground truth CGA in the same manner. There are no substantial differences in this test run 
of Case lover the two unit test run of Case 1. 
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Figure 19. Case 1, Eleven Units 
Note that the uni t whose perception abruptly SlOpS, as indicated by the line 
that ends at approximately 7.75 days, has become combat ineffective according to the 
rules of FI1..M and is no longer capable of maintaining a perception. All slight differcnce.~ 
reflect the nilldomness of the asset counts by the sensor model. 
b) Case 2 
Case 2 is shown in Figure 20. For Case 2, all units have sensors and 
information is shared higher-to-lower. The theater perceives only according to its own 
scnsor observations while the divisions have their own sensor observations and, 
eventually, the thcalCr sensor observations, Note tllat divisional sensor observations are 
not shared and each division perceives only according to its own scn.~or ohservations and 
the tllcater observations, There is no composite perception of all available sensor 
information_ The chart shows that the units do not sbare the same perception for tlle 
duration of the test run. 
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case 2 - Parameter Set 1 - 1 1 Units 
Figure 20. Case 2, Eleven Units 
All units initially perceive similar to the discussion of Case 1 of the two uniL test 
An audit of the sensor observation history file indicates that the theater provides 
proportionally more sensor observation infonnation to the divisional units than the sensor 
observations by the division sensors. This provides an overall influence on the posterior 
values for eaeh eOA held by the divisions. However. just prior to time 2.0 days. Blue 
Theater receives a .sensor observation sufficient to decrease the ground truth posterior 
value and increase the eGA Two posterior value. This infonnation is sent down La each 
of the divi.~ional units by the eGA update time 2.0 days with the exception of1F.B3. All 
unit posterior values respond according to Blue Theater except for IF.B3, who maintains 
its current posterior for the ground truth eOA. By the time the next eGA update occurs. 
Blue Theater has received another sensor observation on a node clearly defined by eOA 
One which results in an increased posterior value for the ground truth eGA. TF.B3, along 
with all other divisional units, receive the same infollllation prior to the eGA update. As a 
result, IF.B3 never deviates from its posterior [or the gfOl.Uld truth eGA. The divisional 
units increase their posterior values with a slight time lag which is appropriate considering 
the mean time delay of infonnation specified between the theater and divisional unilS. A 
similar series of events occur at time 2.75 where one unit receives a sensor observation 
too late for inclusion in the eGA update. Group.I-3 does not receive a sensor report 
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from Blue Theater in time for inclusion in the COA update and subsequently does not alter 
its posterior. No subsequent observations occur during the next period between e OA 
updates and by the following COA update, a new sensor ohservation increases all uni t 
posterior values for the ground truth COA with high probability. Group.1-3 never 
deviates from perceiving the ground truth eOA Subsequent fluctuations in the posteriors 
reflected by the curves in the chart are due to the stochastic nature of the sensor model as 
previously discu~r;cd. 
c) Case 3 
Case 3 is shown in Figure 21. For Case 3, all units have sensors and 
infonnation is shared lower-to higher. The divisions perceive only acconling to their own 
sensor ohservations while the theater has both its own sensor observations and, eventually, 
each division's sensor observations. Note that divisional sensor observations are not 
shared between the divisions. The theater is a composite perception of all available sensor 
infonnation. The chart shows that the units do not share the same perception for the 
duration of tlle test run. 
case 3 - Parameter Set 1 - 11 Units 











The units in this simulation run behave as discussed in the two unit 
simulation run of Case 3. There are more units receiving their own reports and perceiving 
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only according to those reports. Blue Theater's curve represents a composite of all 
divisional sensor infonnation to include its own sensor infonnation and is similar to the 
two unit simulation ron of Case 3. Note that a few of the units (Navy task forces) never 
receive any sensor infonnation and remain at the equally likely perception. Many of the 
units eventually receive sensor observations on clearly defined nodes indicating COA One, 
while a few unit<; receive infonnation on nodes similarly defined on two eOAs and as a 
result perceive the incorrect eOA. 
A check using the audit process indicates that each divisional unit is 
perceiving cxclusivcly acconling to the sensor reports generated by the sensor it owns, 
while Blue Theater is receiving all sensor observation infonnation as intended by the Case 
3 con leal representation. 
d) Case 4 
Case 4 is shown in Figure 22. For Case 4, only the divisions have sensors 
and infonnation is shared lower-to higher. 
Case 4 - Parameter Set 1 -11 Units 
Time In Days 










The divisions perceive only according to their own sensor observations and 
the thea~r perceives according to all the divisional sensor observations. The chan shows 
that the units do not share the same perception for the duration of the test run. The 
striking difference between this simulation run and the two unit simulation run is the Blue 
Theater perception over the course of the run. In the two unit case, the theater perceived 
exactly as did the unit sending the tbeater its only source ofinfonnation. The posterior for 
the g round truth eOA was small over the course of the run. The cleven unit run results in 
a Blue Theater posterior of the ground truth eOA similar to a case where the theater 
owns a sensor. In essence, Blue Theater, given enough infonnation from various units on 
the battlefield. arrives at the same perception as it would if it owned a sensor and was 
looking at the theater il~elf. All the divisional perceptions arc occurring as previously 
discussed in the two unit simulation ruo. 
e) Case 5 
Case 5 is shown in Figure 23. For Case 5, only the theater has a sensor 
and information is shared higher-to-Iowcr. The results of this simulation run arc exactly a~ 
discussed in the two unit case and will not be repeated. 
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case 5 ~ Parameter Set 1 ~ 11 Units 
Time In Days 






- - MPS.B4 
--'TF.Bl 
The theater perceives only according to its own sensor observations and 
each dlvision perceives only according LO the same theater sensor observations. Note that 
each division receives all the available sensor observation information since there is only 
one sensor in this control representation. Both the theater and the divisions maintain a 
composite perception of all available sensor information. The chart shows that all units 
share the same perception for the duration of the test run. 
f) Case 6 
Case 6 is shown in Figure 24. For Case 6. all units have sensors but they 
do not share information. The divi~iona1 sensor observations arc not shared and each 
division perceives only accoocling to its own sensor observations. There is no composite 
perception of all available sensor infonnation. The chart shows that the units do not share 
the same perception for the duration of the test run. The analyses of the result~ of this run 
are similar to those discussed for the two unit Case 6 simulation run. 
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Case 6 - Para meter Set 1 - 11 Units 
Figure 24. Case 6, Eleven Units 
B. VARIATIONS IN PARAMETERS 
1. Parameter Set I 
Parameter Sct 1 as applied to control representation Case t is shown in Figure 19 
and is referenced to for all comparisons of the variations in parameter sets. 
2. Parameter Set 2 
Parameter Sct 2 as applied to control representation Case 1 is shown in Figure 25. 
PardIIlcter Sel 2 cbanges the receipt of transmission parameter as deftned by a Bernoulli 
distribution. Parameter Sct I has a Bernoulli parameter of 1.0 which insures all 
transmissions are received. This provides a "perfect" infonnation flow condition since no 
interruptions are JXlssible. Parameter Set 2 reduces the Bernoulli parameter to 0.90 and 
provides a less than "perfect" condition in which transmission may be lost between two 
units. The loss may be due to unitcrrof, interface failure. or interface jamming. 
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Case 1 - Parameter Set 2 • 11 Units 
Time in Days 
Figure 25. Parameter Set 2, Eleven Units 
-8LUE.4-6 
~'~ - 8LUE.AFLD 
_ ...... GROUP.1 -2 
-GROUP.l-S 
Figure 25 shows that three units had sensor information interrupted which caused 
a subsequent shift in their perceptions of the battlefield. An audit of the sensor 
observation history file shows that the divisional units; B1ueA-6. Group. I-2, and the Blue 
Airfield; each "lost" receipt of a sensor observation from the theater at times 3.75 days, 
4.25 days, and 4.25 days, respectively. At approximately the same time, eaeh unit 
received its own sensor observation on nodes which are similarly defmed for more than 
two eOA:;. 1bis resulted in a decrca.~e in the posterior of the ground truth eOA and 
shifted their indlvidual perceptions away from the group perception held by the majority of 
the units. Eventually, with the receipt of subsequent sensor information, each unit whieh 
suffered from a lost message increased the posterior associated with the ground truth 
COA and rejoined the common group perception. All other eGA updates occurred as 
previously discussed. 
3. Parameter Set 3 
Parameter Set 3 as applied to control representation Case I is shown in Figure 26. 
Parameter Set 3 changes the time delay parameter as defined by a Lognormal distrlbutioIL 
Paramcter SCt 1 has Lognormal parameters as specified in Table 1. This provides a basis 
for the time delay of information condition from whieh to compare changes in the 
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parameter values of the mean and SLandard deviation in minutes that describes the time for 
infonnation between two specified unlts. Parameter Set 3 increases the mean and standard 
deviation parameters as specified in Table 3 significantly as compared to Parameter Set 1. 
Case 1 - Parameter Set 3 -11 Units 
Time In DilVs 










Figure 26 shows tha t all unil~ suffered from the cOllSlXIucnccs of increased time 
delays when compared to the base case, Parameter Set 1 of Case 1. Three units had 
sensor infonnation oclays serious enough to cause a subsequent shift in their perceptions 
of the battlefteld away from the perception held hy the group. 11tis result was similar to a 
prcvious discussion on receiving infonnation after the eOA update has occurred. In this 
case, Blue Theater, in the lime interval prior to eOA update time 3.75, is continuing to 
receive sensor observations indicating thc ground truth eOA. However, observations on 
nodes dearly defmed for eOA One occur which do not reach Group.3-2, Group.3-3, and 
Blue.AFLD. Each of these units receive their own sensor observation which indicate a 
eOA othcr than the ground truth. Because of the increased time delay and the stochastic 
process associated with the time at which a unil receives a message, the eOA update 
occurs and these three units update their peoceptiuns according to their own observations 
and not the observations sent hy Blue Theater. The posteriors associated with these threc 
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units' perception of the ground truth decreases. Over time and according to the stochastic 
processes involved, each unit eventually recovers to the shared perception of the group. 
Again, auditing the sensor observation history file, Group.3-3 received an 
observation prior to update time eight days. This caused an upward shift in Group.3-3 
perception. 1be delay of that sensor observation caused the theater not to benefit from 
that infonnation until approximately day nine. At thi~ time. the theater's pen::eption 
responded with a similar upward shift In the mean time, Group.3-3 received sensor 
observations which resulted in a decrease in the ground truth posterior and quickly 
reacbed the same perception held by the theater. 
4. Parameter Set 4 
Parameter Set 4 as applied to control representation Case 1 is shown in Figure 
27. Parameter Set 4 changes the Staff'mg Ability Multiplier which is applied to the 
variance of the sensor observation and is associated with individual units. Parameter Set 1 
has the Staffing Ability Multiplier set to 1.0 for all units, whereas Parameter Set 4 
increases the Staffing Ability Multiplier to 5.0 for each uniL Figure 27 shows very similar 
perceptions when compared to the base case. 
Initially, the Staffing Ability Multiplier did not appear to behave as intended; in this 
case to increase the variance of sensor infonnation and therefore "fog" the perception of 
the battlefield. Thi.~ result potentially confinns a suspicion that the variance component in 
the CGA update may not be applied properly in the coding of FILM:. A similar result has 
been discovered during other research endeavors using FILM. (Nelson, 1994) 
Conducting a sensitivity analysi~ of the variance by increasing the Sta([mg Ability 
Multiplier for successive runs of the same scenario will confmn Lhis suspicion. 
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Case 1 - Parameter Set 4 - 11 Units 
Time In Days 








Subscqu~nt changes La the Staffing Ability Multiplier were made to deLermine if a 
positive direction of change would produce the intended behavior and what magnitude of 
change was required when applied to the set variance of the .<;ensor. The simulation run 
result~ wer~ not sensitive to change until the following parameter set was rcached. Table 
10 shows Parameter Set 4a. 
Table 10. Par.uncter Sct 4a 
Parameter Set 4a increases the Staffmg Ability Multiplier LO a factor of 100 for the 
divisional units and keeps the Staffing Ability Multiplier at 1.0 for the theater for 
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comparison internal to the run. This sh(mld produce a sharp increase in the variability 
associated with the sensor observatiollli when received by the divisions. Essentially, the 
Staffing Ability Multiplier is controlling the variance associated with the sensor. To 
further define the effect of the increased Staffing Ability Multiplier, only two units were 
aUowed to have individual perceptions, the theater and a division. The effects due to the 
Staffing Ability Multiplier should occur to the division alone. Parameter Set 4a as applied 
to control representation Ca~e 1 is shown in 
Figure 28. 
Case 1 - Parameter Set 4a - 2 Units 
I-Bo. I 
-Group.2·1 
TIme In Days 
Figure 28. Parameter Set 4a, Two Units 
Given a very large Staffing Ability Multiplier, the divisional unit does have it~ 
perception drawn away from the theater perception in a control representation where it 
has been shown that the two perceptions would be similar if not for the confowuling 
introduced by the Staffmg Ability Multiplier. However, it requires a relatively large 
magnitude of change to the variance to achieve this "intended" result. Gearly, the 
suspicion that the variance may be applied improperly in the coding of FfLM is justified 
and warrants investigation. 
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5. Parameter Set 5 
Parameter Set 5 as applied to control representation Case 1 is shown in 
Figure 29. Parameter Set 5 changes the Staffmg Ability Multiplier which i~ applied to the 
varianee of the sensor observation and i~ a.~s()dated with individual units. Parameter Set 5 
decrca.~es the Staffing Ability Mulliplier to 0.8 for each unit. Figure 27 shows very 
similar perceptions when compared to the base case. It appears that all the units begin to 
decrease in their perception of the Red ground truth COA earlier than the base case. 
Again, the Stafting Ahility Multiplier docs notappcar to behave as intended; in this case La 
decrease the variance of sensor infonnation and therefore "clarify" the perception of the 
battlefield. TI:!is leads to the same confirmation that the variance may not be applied 
properly a.~ discussed previously. 
case 1 - Parameter Set 5 - 11 Units 
Time In Days 
Figure 29. Parameter Set 5, Eleven Units 
Again, a sensitivity analysis \vas performed to determine the magnitude of change 
required to effect the resulLs of the simulation run. Table 11 shows Parameter Sct 5a and 
represent the first Staffmg Ability Multiplier valm~s less than one where a noticeahle 
sensitivity in the simulation run resulted. 
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Table 11. Parameter Set Sa 
Parameter 5a decreases the Staffmg Ability Multiplier to a factor of 0.01 for the divisional 
units and keeps the Staffing Ability Multiplier at 1.0 for the theater. This should produce 
a sharp decrease in the variability associated with the sensor observations when received 
by the divisions. Again, to further define the effect of the decreased Staffing Ability 
Multiplier, only two units were allowed to have individual perceptions. the theater and a 
division. The effeets due to the Staffmg Ability Multiplier should oceur to the division 
alone. Parameter Set 5a as applied to control representation Case 1 is shown in Figure 30. 
case 1 - Parameter Set 5a - 2 Units 
Time In Days 
Figure 30. Parameter Set Sa, Two Units 
84 
[he dimional unit reaches the same perception as Ehe theater, but with a delay. 
Given the control representation, both unit~ should share the same perception. It also 
holds the ground truth perception longer than the theater. Again, this confinns the 
suspicion that the variance may re applied improperly in the coding of FILM is justified 
and warrants investigation. 
C. EXCURSIONS 
1. Unit Test Run of Case 1 of the Korean Scenario 
Case 1 is shown in Figure 31. For Case 1, all units have sensors and they share all 
infonnation, 1hc chart shows that all units share the same perception for the duration of 
the test run. Ibe rationale for the results is the same as explained for the two unit and the 
cleven unit case and will not be repeated. The purpose of the excursion is to dctennine 
the cost in computer time resources by increasing the number of units with perceptions, 
and therefore the number of Bayesian posterior distributions, to be maintained. 
1bis excursion took a 486/66 Megahertz personal computer over 48 hours to run 
onc replication and produced 3,661 pages of sensor observation history output. The 
eleven unit test run for Case I took the same personal computer one and a half hours and 
pnxluced 2,872 pages of sensor observation history output. Increasing the number of 
units with individual perceptions clearly consume:; a large amount of computing resources. 
TItis resource problem will be reduced or eliminated once FfLM is converted to operate 
on Sun Workstations. 
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case 1 - Parameter Set 1 - 26 Units 
Time In Days 















2_ Six Unit Test Run of a Composite Case of the Korean Scenario 
The. composite case is shown in Figure 32_ The composite case control 
representation is shown in Figure 11. The purpose for this excursion is to show that a 
control representation may include a mixture of relationships between units and sensors. 
Any desired control relationship is capable of being represented. The rationale for the 
behavior of the units follows what has been discussed in the previous sections and may be 
analyzed using the audit process of the history me. 
Overall, the units generally tend to share a similar perception of the battlefield with 
a few units experiencing deviations. The theater and the divisional units; Group.3-l, 
BlueA-6, and TF.Bl; suffer from the effccl~ of the time delays associated with the control 
representation and the multiple levels that sensor infonnation must pass. Eventually, all 
units receive all infonnation in this representation. 
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Composite Case" Parameter Set 1 "6 Units 
Time I" Days 









V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMM:ENDATIONS 
A. CONCLUSIONS 
1. General 
nle intent of this research effort was to provide the capability to model battlefield 
control of sensors and wLits in a perecption based computer simulation and thcreby 
provide an analysis tool to dctermine the cffects of varying control structures given an 
opemtionai context. Eight components represent the general control modeL All eight 
components were computer coded and integrated into the late.~t vcrsion of the Future 
Theater Levcl Model. All eight componenl~ are easily managed by the anaiy..;t using 
FILM to study the effects of control in hattlefield simulations. 
Sevcn of the eight components clearly provide the intended control 
characterization. An operational side can now have individual wLits with their own, 
potentially unique, perceptions of the battlefield. An opemtional side can describe the 
owner.>hip of sensor assets and restrict those assets to observe only within the owning 
unit 's area of influence. An operational side can describe, within a simulation, their 
control arcttitecture and control doctrine. Finally, useful and nominally realistie 
representations of time delays of infonnation and the probability of receipt of infonnation 
can be managed by the analyst to specify sensoHo-unit and unit-to-unit enabling 
technology Iink.~. 
One component, the Staffmg Ability Multiplier, requires the proper application of 
the variance i.n the eOA update prior to a complete test of the Staffmg Ability Multiplier. 
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B. RECOMMENDATIONS 
1. Modifications to FTLM, Application of Sensor Variance 
The application of Sensor Variance within the eOA update requires further 
investigation to detenninc its con-e.ctness. Ibis will either confum or improve FILM and 
provide a clear foundation to test the Staffing Ability Multiplier. 
2. Modifications To The General Control Model 
The following recommendations for future work will enhancc the general control 
model as currently implemented in FILM. 
a) Staffing Ability Multiplier Verification 
Test the Staffing Ability Multiplier once the application of the sensor 
variance L~ applied properly in the coding of FILM. Determine the relative magnitude of 
the multiplier to ensure realistic changes in the results of the simulation run. 
b) Time Delay Parameter Research 
Future development of the control model can address the hardware 
transmission times associated with specified enabling technology links and add them onto 
the headquarters processing times if substantial. Parameter values a<;.Sociated with links 
between units of specified types need to be detennined. Ibis research will provide a more 
realistic representation of delay times based upon the types of units involved in the link. 
As an alternative to enumerating a fixed set of parameter values for all unit type 
relationships. a First-In-FIrst-Out (FIFO) (Ross, 1989), single server queuing model may 
be developed to vary the delay time between units based upon the quantity of information 
the un.it~ are receiving at any given time. 
c) Receipt of Transmission Parameter Research 
Future development of the control model can address specific mean 
parameter values associated with unit~ when receiving information. The parameter value 
should account for the effects of human en-or, equipment failures, and jamming. 'This 
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research will provide a more realistic representation of the probability associated with 
receiving transmissions based upon the types of units involved. 
3. Ad ditions to the General Control Model, Dynamic Courses of Action 
The following recommendation for future work will build upon the general control 
model as currently implemented in FTLM. Now that sub-units have the capability to 
maintain lheir own perception of the battlefield, sub-units should be allowed to choose 
their own course of action at critical decision points. The use of enumerated decision selS 
for a unit at critical decision points will permit the unit to pursue what it believes is the 
correct counter course of action. Courses of action will become dynamic and flexible. 
Control representations ensuring hierarchical !,'llidance will become even more important 
to ensure sub-units do not act as renegade units; however the potential will exist for such. 
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APPENDIX A. AN EXTRACT FROM A FrLM SCENARIO DATA FILE 
RECORD 
the foUowing is an extract of the general control model component~ whicb. have 
been incorporated into the FILM Scenario Data File Record. 1bis record is used to 
define the operational context of the simulation. 
757816775 1 0 J2 5 6 .140-18N J21-JOE 34-2fJN 131-15E 150 
0.1 1 t .35 1 I' 
, end of parameter data - start side data 
BLUE I I I 1 
1. 1. 1. 5.1. 1. I.' 
I. 2. .05 2. .01 .01 .05 2. .8 
0 22.8245 
24 60 5 2 3 1 0 iO 
.. end of side data - St:rrl ~idc relationship data 
.. elld of atom dala - stan combat unit data 






4400 3990 3990 3990399{) 440044004400 3990 
* cod of combru: unit data - start logistic unit data 
* cod of logistic llnitdata - start naval unit data 






'll-lACH PERRY IR1 
RENTZ PERRY J.l'G 
.. end of naval unit data - SLart air base data 
, P1ag llSc(I\O indicate the option to add perceptions for individual combat units, naval onits, and/or air 
-. 1 Staffmg Ability Multiplier for the operational side Blue. 
1 Time between eOA updares. Used OIlly if the iIldividual uuit maintailL~ a perception . 
• Staffing Ability Multiplkr for tire sub-unit. 
9l 












* end of who receives .sensor reportS - stan sensor to lIDit data 
Red.SCIlS.I Red 1 I 10 I 1. 
Red.Sens.2 Red I I 12.5 1. 
B1ue.Seu.1 Blue 11151 l. 
Blue.Sen.l Group.1-21 I 10 1 1. 
Blue.Scn.1 Group.I-31110 I 1. 
BLue.Sen.l Group.3-1 1 I 10 I L 
Blue.Sen.1 Group.3-2l 1 10 1 1. 
Blue.Sen.1 Group.3-31lI0 1 1. 
Blue.Scn.1 B1uc.4-6 1 I 10 I l. 
B1ut:.Sen.llF.Bl 1 1 10 1 1. 
BLue.Sen.llF.B3 I 1 10 I 1. 
Blue.Sen.1 MPS.D4 I 1 10 1 1. 
BLue.Sen.1 BLUE.AR..D 1110 I 1. 
* eod of scosor to unit - stan unit to unit data 
Blue Group.l -21 1 20 5 1. 
Dlue Group.I-3 I 1205 1. 
Blue Group.3-l I I 205 1. 
Blue Group.3-2 1 1 20 5 1. 
Blue Group.3-31 1205 1. 
BlueBlue.4-6 I 1205 I. 
BluelF.BIII2051. 
BluelF.B311205 I. 
Blue MPS.B4 1 1205 L 
Blue BLUE.AF1"D 1 1 205 1. 
Gmup.I-2BlueIII02 L 
Group.I -3 Blue I 1 102 1. 
Group.3-1 Bluc 1 1 102 1. 
Group.3-2 Blue I 1 102 1. 
Group.3-3 Blue I I 102 1. 
Blue.4-<iBlue 11102 l. 
IF.BI BLue II 1021. 
IF.B3 Blue I I 102 1. 
MPS.B4 Blue 1 1 10 2 1. 
BLUE.AFLD Blue 11 102 1. 
,. end of unit to uoit data 
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APPENDIX B. AN EXTRACT FROM A FTLM SENSOR OBSERVA n ON 
IllSTORYFILE 
The foll owing is an extract of the composite case sensor ohservation history file. 
This type of file is ust".d as the audit record for each sensor observation. A scnsor 
observation can be traced from the initial detection and a..~ it is passed from unit-to-wtit 
until its fmal receipt as deftned by the control representation in the FILM Scenario Data 
rile Record. 
Time 3.34254 BLUEA-8's sensor BLUE.SEN.l searching node WON5AN 
Tunc 3.34949 BLUE.4-S receives transuussion from sensor BLUE.SEN.Illbou! node WONSAN 
RED COUlbat unit assets 
TFV count - 24 
APCcount-l 
ARl1U..ERY count - 0 
BRIGADE combinations are as follows: 
(INFAN1RY. SlNFANlRY, ARMOR. MECHANIZED,) 
Ullit 
Combination Posterior APe ARTIlLERY 
(0,0,0,0) 1.0000Xl a (0.00) 0 (O.l:xl) 0 (0.00) 0 ( 0.(0) 
Tune 3.34949 BLUE.4-S will pass information to GROUP.2-1 
Time 3.34949 BLUE.4-8 receives transmission from sensor BLUE.SEN.l about D<XIe WONSAN 
RED logistic package assets 
TANKERS count - 347 
FLALBEDS count-513 
Logistic typt: combin.'Uions arc as follows: 
(LQGUNH.) 
Unit 
Combination Posterior TANKERS FLAT_BEDS 
(0) 0.000000 0 (0.00) 0 ( OJXl) 
(I) 0.000000 198 (3.54) 390 ( 4.24) 
(2) 0.000000 265 (4.08) 454 ( 4.57) 
(3)0.ooooo::J 298 ( 4.33) 480 ( 4.70) 
(4) O.OOOOJO 318 (4.47) 494 ( 4.17) 
(5) 0.000000 331 (4.56) 503 ( 4.82) 
(6) 0.000019 340 (4.63) S09 ( 4.84) 
(7) 0 .999981 347 (4_68) 514 ( 4.S7) 
Time 3_34949 BLUE.4-8 will pass informalion toGROUP.2-1 
rime 3.35807 GROu'l'.2-1 receives information from BLUE.4-8 about node WONSAN 
RED logistic package a.'iselS 
TANKERS count· 347 
I'LAL BEDS count- 513 




Combination Posterior TANKERS RAT_BEDS 
(0) O.O()()(X)(} 0 (0.00) 0 ( 0.00) 
(1) 0.000000 198 (3.54) 390 ( 4.24) 
(2) 0.000000 265 (4.08) 454 ( 4.57) 
(3)0.000000 298 ( 4.33) 480( 4.70) 
(4) 0.000000 318 (4.47) 494 ( 4.TI) 
(5) OJX>OOXl 331 (4.56) 503 ( 4.82) 
(6) 0.000019 340 (4.63) 509 ( 4.84) 
(7) 0.999981 347 (4.68) 514 ( 4.87) 
Time 3.35807 GROUP.2- 1 will pass information to GROUP.3-1 
Time 3.35863 GROUP .2-1 receives information from BLUEA-8 about node WONSAN 
RED combat unit assets 
TANK count - 6 
IFV count - 24 
APCcount-l 
ARTlLLER Y count· 0 
BRIGADE combinations am as follows: 
(INFANmY, SINFANTRY, ARMOR, MECHANIZED,) 
Unit 
Combination Posterior TANK IFV APC ARl'Il..LERY 
(0,0,0,0) 1.000000 0 (0.00) 0 (0.00) 0 (0,00) 0 ( 0.00) 
Time 3.35863 GROUP.2-1 will pass information 10 GROUP.3-1 
Time 3.36550 GROUP.3-1 rcceivesinformatioo from GROUP.2-1 about node WQNSAN 
RED logistic package assets 
'lAl'OCERS count - 347 
FLAT_BEDS room -513 
Logistic type combinations arc as follows: 
(LOGUNrr,) 
Unit 
Combination Posterior TANKERS FLAT_BEDS 
(0) 0.000000 0 (0.00) 0 ( 0.(0) 
(1) 0.000000 198 (3.54) 390 ( 4.24) 
(2) 0.000000 265 (4.08) 454 ( 4.57) 
(3) 0.000000 298 (4.33) 480 ( 4.70) 
(4) 0.000000 318 (4.47) 494 ( 4.77) 
(5) 0.000000 331 (4.56) 503 ( 4.82) 
(6) 0.000019 340 (4.63) 509 ( 4.84) 
(7) 0.999981 347 (4.68) 514 ( 4.87) 
Time 3.36809 GROUP.3-1 receives informatioo from GROUP.2-1 about node WONSAN 
RED combat unit assets 
TANK count . 6 
IFYcoont-24 
APCcoont - l 
ARTILLERY count - 0 
BRIGADE combinations are as follows: 
(INFANTRY, STNFANIRY, ARMOR, MECHANIZED,) 
Unit 
96 
Com!)ination Posterior TANK APe ARTJI.LERY 
(0,0,0,0) 1.00000] 0 (0.00) 0 (0.00) a (0.00) 0 ( 0.00) 
Time 3,44046 BLUE sensor BLUE-SEN.1 searching node P'YONGGANG 
Time 3.44713 BLUE sensor BLUE.SEN.l searching node KOSONG 
Time 3.45124 BLliE commandcr receivcs trallsmi5Sioll from >em.,or BLUE-SEN.t aooutnode 
P'YONGGANG 
RED logistic package a<;Sl:t~ 
rA."'KERSwuut-359 
FLAT_BEDS count-485 
Logistic type com!)inations are a~ follows' 
( LOGUNlT, ) 
Com!)ination Posterior TANKERS RAT_BEDS 
(0) O.ocoo.:xJ 0.(0) 0 ( 0.00) 
(1) O.OOO!KXl 3.54) 370 ( 4.24) 
(2) O.oooo:xJ 4.(8) 430 ( 4.57) 
(3) O.oooo:xJ 4.33) 455 ( 4.70) 
(4) 0.000000 4.47) 469 ( 4.77) 
(5) O.{X)(X)OO 4.56) 477 ( 4.82) 
(6) 0.000082 4.63) 483 ( 4.84) 
(7) 0.999918 4.68) 487 ( 4.87) 
Time 3.45124 BLUE c(l:!lllllaIlder will pass inf=ntion to GROUP.2-1 
Time 3.45124 BLUE commander will pass infonnatioll to BLUE.4-6 
TIme 3.45124 BLiTE commandcr will passinfOI1ll3.tion ill 'IF.BI 
Time 1.45124 BLUE commander receives transmission from sensor BLUE.SEN.1 aoout node 
P'YONGGANG 




ARTILlliRY cOlmt- 3 
BRIGADE combinations arc as follows: 
(INFA."I1RY, SINFANfRY, ARMOR, MECHANl7ED,) 
Uuit 
Comhination Posterior TFV APC AR]ll..LERY 
Time 3.45 124 BLUU commander witt pass infonnation to GROUP.2-1 
Time 1.45124 BLUE cOIllIIllIIIder will pass infonnation to BLUE.4-6 
Timc 3.45124 BLUE commander will pass information to TEB1 
Tim" 1.45776 BLUE couuuandcr receives trdIlsnris~iou. from sen,or m .lm.SEN.l about node KOSONG 
RED logistic package as;;et:; 
TANKERS count - 349 
FLAT_BEDS count - 522 
Logistic lypt: COlllbinations are as [onow~ 
(T.CXTTTNH,) 
Unit 
Combinatioll Posterior TANKERS R.A·CBEDS 
(0) 0.000000 0 (0.00) 0 ( 0.00) 
(1) 0.000000 200 (3.54) 396 ( 4.24) 
(2) O.OOOCIOO 266 (4.08) 46t ( 4.57) 
(3) O.OOOCIOO 299 (4.33) 488 ( 4.70) 
(4) O.OOOCIOO 319 (4.47) 502 ( 4.77) 
(5) 0.000000 332 (4.56) 511 ( 4.82) 
(6)0.000002 342 ( 4.63) 5I8( 4.84) 
(7) 0.999998 349 (4.68) 522 ( 4.87) 
Time 3.45776 BLUE commander will pass infonnation to GROUP.2- I 
Time 3,45776 BLUE coIlltllallder will pass lnfonuation 10 BLUE.4-6 
Time 3.45776 DLUE COllllll3Ilder will pass information !OTEBl 
Time 3,45776 BLUE COIlllllalIder receives transInission from sensor BI.UE.SEN.t aboUI node KOSONG 
RED combat mill assets 
TANKcolll1t - 3 
u'V coullI - 7 
APCcount-1 
ARTll.lERYcolll1t-O 
BRIGADE combinations an: as follows: 
(INFANTRY, STNFANJRY, ARMOR, MECHANIZED,) 
Unit 
Combination Posterior TANK IFV APC ARTIllERY 
(0,0,0,0)1.000000 0 (0.00) 0 (o.cm 0 (0.00) 0 ( 0.00) 
Tune 3,45776 BLUE commander will pass infonnatioo to GROUP.2·t 
Time 3,45776 BLUE commander will pass information toBLUE,4-6 
Time 3.45776 BLUE conunander will pass information !OTEBI 
Time 3.46178 BLUE,4-6 receives infOCJII.ation from BLUE commander about node P'YONGGANG 
RED combat lll1it assets 
TANKcotml-8 
rFV count - 4 
APe count-O 
AR11LLERY count - 3 
BRIGADE combinations are as follows: 
(INFANTRY. SINFANTRY, ARMOR, MECHANIZED.) 
Unit 
Combination Postt:rior TANK IFV APC ARTILLERY 
(0.0.0.0) 1.00000) 0 (0.00) 0 (0.00) 0 (0.00) 0 ( 0.00) 
Tune 3.46424 GROUP 2-1 m:civcs information from BLUE commander about node P'YONGGANG 




ARTILLERY count - 3 
BRIGADE combinatioos are as follows: 
(INFAN'rn.Y, SINFANTRY, ARMOR, MECHANIZED,) 
Unit 
Combination 1'0Sterior TANK APC ARTILLERY 
(0,0.0,0) LOOOOJO 0 (0.00) 0 (0.00) 0 (o.cm 0 ( 0.00) 
Time 3.46424 GROUP.2- t will pass infOl:nl8tion toGROUP.3-1 
"lime 3.46533 TF.Bt receives information fmm BLUE commander about node KOSONG 
98 
RED Iogi~tic package assets 
TANKERS count - 349 
fLAT_BEDS count - 522 
Logistic type combinations are as follows: 
(LOGUNTf,) 
Unit 
Combination Posterior TANKERS FLATJlEDS 
(0) 0.000000 0 (0.00) 0 ( 0.00) 
(1)0.000000 200( 3.54) 396 ( 4.24) 
(2) 0.000000 266 (4.08) 461 ( 4.57) 
(3) O.OOOIJOO 299 (4.33) 488 ( 4.70) 
(4) 0.000000 319 (4.47) 502 ( 4.77) 
(5) 0.000000 332 (4.56) 511 ( 4.82) 
(6) 0.000002 342 (4.63) 518 ( 4.84) 
(7) 0.999998 349 (4.68) 522 ( 4.87) 
Time 3.46540 1F.Bl receives information from BLUE coIIlIllilIlder about node PYONGGANG 
RED logistic package assets 
TANKERS count - 359 
FLAT_BEDS count - 485 
Logistic type comhinations are as foUOws: 
(LOCiUNTI,) 
Unit 
Combination Posterior TANKERS I·LAT_BEDS 
(0) 0.000000 0 (0.00) 0 ( 0.00) 
(1) 0.000000 204 (3.54) 370 ( 4.24) 
(2) 0.000000 273 (4.08) 430 ( 457) 
(3) 0.000tXl0 307 (4.33) 455 ( 4.70) 
(4) 0.000000 327 (4.47) 469 ( 4.77) 
(5) OJ)OQC:XX) 341 (4.56) 477 ( 4.82) 
(6) 0.000082 351 (4.63) 483 ( 4.84) 
(7)0.9999 18 358( 4.68) 487 ( 4.87) 
Time 3.46613 IlLUE.4-6 receives information from BLUE commander about node P'YONGGAKG 
RED logistic packagc assets 
TANKERS count - 359 
FLAT_BEDS coUDt-485 
Logistic type comhinations are as follows; 
(LOGUNlT, ) 
Combi.nation Posterior TA."'ilCERS RAT _BEDS 
(0) O.()(j()()()() 0 (0.00) 0 ( 0.00) 
(1) O.OOIlOOO 204 (3.54) 370 ( 4.24) 
(2) 0.000000 273 (4.00) 430 ( 457) 
(3) 0.000000 307 (4.33) 455 ( 4.71l) 
(4) 0.000000 327 (4.47) 469 ( 4.77) 
(5) 0.000000 341 (4.56) 4Tl ( 4.82) 
(6) 0.000082 351 (4.63) 483 ( 4.S4) 
(7) 0.9999t!! 35H (4.68) 487 ( 4.87) 
TIlDe 3.46862 GROUP.2-t recciv~s informatioo from BLUE commander about node KOSO).lG 
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RED logistic package assets 
TANKERScount-349 
FLAT_DEDS count- 522 
Logistic type combinations are as follows: 
( LOOUNTr, ) 
Unit 
Combination Posterior TANKERS FLAT_BEDS 
(0) 0.000000 0 (0.00) 0 ( OJXl) 
(1) 0.000000 200 (3.54) 396 ( 4.24) 
(2) 0.000000 266 (4.08) 461 ( 4.57) 
(3) 0.000000 299 (4.33) 488 ( 4.70) 
(4) 0.000000 319 (4.47) 502 ( 4.77) 
(5)0.000000 332( 4.56) 511 ( 4.82) 
(6) 0.000002 342 (4.63) 518 ( 4.84) 
(7) 0.999998 349 (4.68) 522 ( 4.87) 
Tune 3.46862 GROUP.2·1 will pass mfmmation to GROUP.3·1 
Tune 3.46945 GROUP.2-1 receives infonnation from BLUE commander about node KOSONG 
RED combat unit assets 
TANK count - 3 
IFV colillt-7 
APCcolillt - l 
ARTILLERY count - 0 
BRIGADE combinations are as follows: 
(INFAN'IRY, SlNFAN'IRY, ARMOR, MEf' __ HANIZED,) 
Unit 
Combination Posterior TANK APe ARTIlLERY 
(0,0,0,0) 1.000000 0 (0.00) 0 (0.00) 0 (0.00) 0 ( 0.00) 
Time 3.46945 GROUP.2-t will pass infonnatioo to GROUP.3-! 
Tlmc 3.46975 GROUP.3-1 receives information from GROUP 2 -1 about node P'YONGGANG 
RED combat unit assets 
TANK count - 8 
IFV count _ 4 
APCcount -0 
ARm..LERYcount-3 
BRIGADE combinations are as follows: 
(INFAN"lRY, SlNFANTRY, ARMOR, MECHANIZED,) 
Hnit 
Combination Posterior TANK IFV APC ARTILLERY 
(0,0,0.0) 1.000000 0 (OJ.lO) 0 (0.00) 0 (0.00) 0 ( 0.00) 
TIlDe 3.46975 GROUP.3· l will pa.<>s information to BLllE.4--8 
Time 3.47134 GROUP.2-1 =ives informalion from BLUE commander about node PYONGGANG 
RED logistic package assets 
TANKERS count - 359 
H.ALBEDS C()nn! - 485 




Combination Posterior T ANKERS FLAT~BEDS 
(0) 0.000000 0 (0.00) 0 ( 0.00) 
(1) 0.000000 204 (3.54) 370 ( 4.24) 
(2) O.()()(X)(X) 273 (4.08) 430 ( 4.57) 
(3) 0.000000 307 (4.33) 455 ( 4.70) 
(4) O.OOIKXKI 327 (4.47) 469 ( 4.77) 
(5) 0.000000 341 (4.56) 477 ( 4.82) 
(6) 0.000082 35t (4.63) 483 ( 4.84) 
(7) 0.999918 358 (4.68) 487 ( 4.87) 
Time 3.47134 GROUP.2-1 will pass information to GROUP.3-t 
Time 3.47206 BLUF..4-6 receives information frum BLlJE commander about node KOSONG 
RED logistic package assets 
TANKERS count - 349 
FLAT_BEDS count - 522 
Logistic type combinations arc as follows: 
(LOGVNH.) 
Unit 
Combination Posterior TANKERS A.,AT....BEDS 
(0) 0.000000 0 (0.110) 0 ( 0.00) 
(1) 0.000000 200 (3.54) 396 ( 4.24) 
(2) 0.000000 266 (4.08) 461 ( 4.57) 
(3) O.OOOOOJ 299 (4.33) 488 ( 4.70) 
(4) 0.000000 319 (4.47) 502 ( 4.77) 
(5)0.00000J 332 ( 4.56) 511 (4.82) 
(6) 0.000002 342 (4.63) 518 ( 4.84) 
(7) 0.999998 349 (4.68) 522 ( 4.87) 
Time 3.47456 "IF.Bl receives infOllll3tion from BLUE commander about node P'YONGGANG 
REDoombatunitassets 




BRIGADE combinations arc as fOllows: 
(iNFANTl{Y, SINFANTRY, ARMOR. MECHANIZED,) 
Combination Postcrioc TANK APe 
(0,0.0.0) UXXXIOO 0 (0.00) 0 (0.00) 0 (0.00) 0 ( 0.00) 
Time 3.47511 GROli'P.3-1 receives information from GROUP.2- t about node KOSONG 
RED logistic IJll£i<age assets 
TANKERS count· 349 
FLAT_BEDS count - 522 
Logistic type combinations arc as follows: 
(LOGUNIT. ) 
Unit 
Combinatioo Posterior TANKERS FLA"CBEDS 
(0) 0.000000 0 (0.00) 0 ( 0.00) 
(1) OJX)()OOO 200 (3.54) 396 ( 4.24) 
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(2) 0.000000 266 (4.08) 461 ( 4.57) 
(3) 0.000000 299 (4.33) 488 ( 4.70) 
(4) 0.000000 319 (4.47) 502 ( 4.77) 
(5) 0.000000 332 (4.56) 51 1 ( 4.82) 
(6) 0.000002 342 (4.63) 518 ( 4.84) 
(7) 0.999998 349 (4.68) 522 ( 4.87) 
TIme 3.47511 GROUP.3-1 will pass information to BLUE.4-8 
Time 3.47658 BUIE.4-6 receives infornmtlon from BLUE commander about node KOSONG 
RED combat unit assets 
TANKcount-3 
TFV connt - 7 
APCcouot-1 
ARTILLERY count - 0 
BRIGADE combinations arc as follows: 
(INFAN]RY, SL~FANlRY, ARMOR, MECHANIZED,) 
Combination Posterior TANK IFV APe ARTIllERY 
(0,0.0.0) 1.000000 0 (0.00) 0 (0.00) ° (0.00) ° ( 0.00) 
Time 3.47689 BLUE.4·8 receives information fium GROUP 3-1 about node P'YONGGANG 
RED combat unit assets 
TANK COUllt - 8 
TFV count - 4 
APCCOUllt - O 
ARTILLERY count - 3 
BRIGADE combinations are as follows: 
(TNFAl\'1RY, SINFANIRY, ARMOR, :MECHANI.ZFD,) 
Unit 
Combination Posterior TANK IFV APC ARTIlLERY 
(0,0,0,0) 1.000000 0 (OJlO) ° (0.00) ° (0.00) 0 ( 0.(0) 
Time 3,47705 'I1'.Bl =:eives infonnation from BLUE commandeT about node KOSONG 
RED combat unitasscts 
TANK count - 3 
TFV count· 7 
APCcoun! -I 
ARTJLLER Y count -° 
BRIGADE combinations are as follows: 
(INFM'1RY, SINFANIRY, ARMOR, MECHANIZED,) 
Unit 
Combination PoSlCrior TANK APC ARTULERY 
(0.0.0.0) 1.000000 0 (0.00) ° (0.00) ° (0.00) ° ( 0.00) 
rime 3.47772 GROUP.3-! receives infonnatioofrom GROUP.2- t about node KOSONG 




ARTILLERY count - 0 
BRIGADE combinations are as follows: 
(INPANIRY. SlNFANTRY. ARMOR, MECHANIZED.) 
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Unit 
Combination Posterior TANK TFV APe ARTIILERY 
(O,O,O,O)1.()()OO)() 0 (OJ)() 0 (0.00) 0 (O.cXI) 0 ( OJXl) 
'llille 3.47772 GROUP.3-1 will pass information to BLUE.4-8 
Tlille 3.47)7,(;7 GROUP.3-1 =ives information from GROUP.2-J aboutllode P'YON"GGANG 
RED logistic packagt: assets 
TANKERS count- 359 
FLAT_BEDS count -485 
Logistic type combinations arc as follows: 
( LOGUNIT,) 
Unit 
Combination POM.erior TANKERS FLAT_BEDS 
(0) O.OOOCOO 0 (0.00) 0 ( 0.00) 
(1) O.()()()()OO 204 (3.54) 370 ( 4.24) 
(2) 0.000000 273 (4.08) 430 ( 4.57) 
(3) 0.000000 307 (4.33) 455 ( 4.70) 
(4) O.O()()()OO 327 (4.47) 469 ( 4.77) 
(5) 0.000000 341 (4.56) 477 ( 4 .82) 
(6) 0.00()()82 35 1 (4.63) 483 ( 4.84) 
(7) 0.999918 358 (4.68) 487 ( 4.87) 
Time 3.47867 GROUP.3-! will pa<;s information 10 BLUE,4-8 
Time 3.48130 ELUE.4-8 receives information from GROUP.3-1 about node KOSONG 
RED logistic package assets 
TA!\'KERS count- 349 
F1A T_BEDS count - 522 
Logistic type combinations are as follows: 
( LOGUNIT.) 
Unit 
Combination Posterior TANKERS FLAT_EEDS 
(0) OJX1OOI,X) 0 (0.00) 0 ( 0.00) 
(1) 0.000000 200 (3.54) 396 ( 4.24) 
(2) 0.000000 266 (4.08) 461 ( 4.57) 
(3) 0.000000 299 (4.33) 4R8 ( 4.70) 
(4) 0.000000 3!9 (4.47) 502 ( 4.77) 
(5) O.OOOCOO 332 (4.56) 511 ( 4 .82) 
(6) 0.000002 342 (4.63) 518 ( 4.84) 
(7) 0.999998 349 (4.6R) 522 ( 4.87) 
Time 3.48310 BLUE.4-8 receives infonnalion fmmGROUP.3-1 about node KOSONG 




ARTD..LERY count - 0 
BRl(iADE combinatioos are as follows: 
( INFANIRY, SINFAN'IRY, ARMOR, MECHANIZED,) 
Combination Posterior IFV APC ARTIlLERY 
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(0,0,0,0) LOOOOOO ° (0.00) ° (0.00) 0 (0.00) 0 ( 0.00) 
Time 3.48412 BLUE.4-8 receives information from GROUP.3-1 about node P'YONGGANG 
RED logistk package assets 
TANKERS count - 359 
F1..AT_BEDS count - 485 
Logistic type combinations arc a.~ follows: 
(LOOUNIT,) 
Unit 
Combination Posterior TANKERS fLATJ3EDS 
(0) 0.000000 0 (0,(10) 0 ( 0.00) 
(1) 0.000000 204 (3.54) 370 ( 4.24) 
(2) 0.000000 Tl3 (4.08) 430 ( 4.57) 
(3) 0.00<Xl00 307 (4.33) 455 ( 4.70) 
(4) O.OOJOOO 327 (4.47) 469 ( 4.77) 
(5) 0.000000 341 (4.56) 471 ( 4.82) 
(6) 0.00(()82 351 (4.63) 483 ( 4.84) 
(7) 0.999911; 358 (4.68) 487 ( 4.87) 
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